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Data driven multiple observer and causal graph approach to fault detection and 
isolation is developed for nuclear power plant sensors and actuators.  It can be integrated 
into the advanced instrumentation and control system for the next generation nuclear 
power plants. 
The developed approach is based on analytical redundancy principle of fault 
diagnosis.  Some analytical models are built to generate the residuals between measured 
values and expected values.  Any significant residuals are used for fault detection and the 
residual patterns are analyzed for fault isolation.  
Advanced data driven modeling methods such as Principal Component Analysis 
and Adaptive Network Fuzzy Inference System are used to achieve on-line accurate and 
consistent models.  As compared with most current data-driven modeling, it is 
emphasized that the best choice of model structure should be obtained from physical 
study on a system. 
Multiple observer approach realizes strong fault isolation through designing 
appropriate residual structures.  Even if one of the residuals is corrupted, the approach is 
able to indicate an unknown fault instead of a misleading fault.  Multiple observers are 
designed through making full use of the redundant relationships implied in a process 
when predicting one variable. 
Data-driven causal graph is developed as a generic approach to fault diagnosis for 
nuclear power plants where limited fault information is available.  It has the potential of 
combining the reasoning capability of qualitative diagnostic method and the strength of 
quantitative diagnostic method in fault resolution.  A data-driven causal graph consists of 
individual nodes representing plant variables connected with adaptive quantitative 
models.  With the causal graph, fault detection is fulfilled by monitoring the residual of 
each model.  Fault isolation is achieved by testing the possible assumptions involved in 
each model.  Conservatism is implied in the approach since a faulty sensor or a fault 
actuator signal is isolated only when their reconstructions can fully explain all the 
abnormal behavior of the system. 
 v
The developed approaches have been applied to nuclear steam generator system 
of a pressurized water reactor and a simulation code has been developed to show its 
performance.  The results show that both single and dual sensor faults and actuator faults 
can be detected and isolated correctly independent of fault magnitudes and initial power 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
 
Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) has been considered as an important strategy 
to improve operational performance in a variety of industries for a long time.  A fault in a 
process is defined as any malfunction of sensors, controllers and field devices at the 
initial stage, which may ultimately affect the operational performance.  The most 
important objectives of fault detection and isolation are to prevent a sudden equipment 
failure, collect information on malfunctions, improve maintenance planning, and have a 
better plant control such that optimal operational performance can be achieved 
(Himmelblau, 1978).  It brings about significant benefits through minimizing the 
downtime, enhancing the safety and reducing the manufacturing cost (Upadhyaya, 1999).  
In nuclear power plants (NPPs), FDI becomes increasingly emphasized with the 
strategic development of advanced plant instrumentation and control.  Owing to the 
revolution of digitization, the abundant available measurements have provided the 
opportunity to automate FDI.  The incorporation of FDI as an indispensable part of 
modern instrumentation and control system has begun to be further speeded up. 
In current nuclear power plants, some major deficiencies of plant instrumentation 
and control design which are affecting the economic performance and safety features, are 
as follows (White, 1994): 
• Unscheduled plant trips are not rare due to component failures. 
• Important indications of abnormal conditions are masked by many less important 
alarms during some transients. 
• Operators face difficulties to determine which alarms are due to an important 
initiating event and which alarms are due to operation action such as out-of-service 
components undergoing maintenance. 
• Due to fault propagation, the fault alarms may occur in an order different from that 
the fault occurs. 
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In order to overcome these problems, the advanced instrumentation and control 
system has been defined with the following features (EPRI, 1994):  
• Fault-tolerant systems should be introduced to avoid misinformation. 
• Digital systems should enable the plant to have self-diagnostics and on-line 
replacement. Failed equipment can be replaced and fixed on non-outage time.  
• “Adaptive tuning, drift-free operation, and nonlinear compensation" should be 
achieved to avoid human errors. 
 In fact, the automation of FDI has become an important measure to differ 
advanced instrumentation and control system from a traditional one in nuclear power 
plants.  Figure 1.1 illustrates the interface between FDI system and the advanced 
instrumentation and control system.  On the one hand, the FDI system is able to provide 
fault information to either an operator support system or a plant surveillance system.  
This information assists operators in making optimal maintenance planning and fault 
management.  On the other hand, the FDI system provides inputs to some software driven 
protection logic and software driven control algorithms either to compensate for fault 
effects or to implement safeguard. 
The overall objective of the thesis is to develop some FDI algorithms that can be 
integrated into the advanced instrumentation and control system.  Because the algorithms 
aim at on-line implementation for a nuclear power plant, the following performances 
must be satisfied: 
• The fault detection module can detect an incipient fault but will not trigger a false 
alarm during any normal plant transients. 
• A fault can be correctly diagnosed regardless of its fault magnitude and the initial 
plant condition when the fault occurs. 
• If one of the fault signatures is corrupted or degenerated due to process noise or 
measurement noise, the algorithm will indicate an unknown fault instead of being 
misdiagnosed as another fault. 
• A fault must be detected and isolated during its fault transient rather than after a new 




















Figure 1.1.  A proposed schematic of on-line incipient fault detection and isolation (FDI) 
























• In order to facilitate modularization in implementation, a decision should be made 
only based on local evidences. 
Since a large safety critical system is being dealt with, the following constraints 
are imposed on the development: 
• The possible faults may not be enumerable. 
• The fault signatures can be obtained only from limited amount of fault data. 
 In order to achieve the FDI algorithm with the above technical specification under 
the above constraints advanced statistical inference based modeling such as Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) and artificial intelligence methods such as Adaptive Network 
Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) are studied in order for adaptive modeling. As 
compared with most current data-driven modeling, the best choice of model structure is 
obtained from physical study on a system.  After a systematic reviewing on the available 
FDI methods in other industries and the implementation of PCA based approach and 
ANFIS model based approach, data driven model causal graph is proposed as a general 
approach to automatic FDI for nuclear power plants.  This approach can naturally arrive 
at efficient data driven modeling.  The fault isolation is based on cause effect analysis on 
model residuals.  Therefore, it is unnecessary to enumerate faults and define the 
associated fault signatures for fault isolation.  Moreover, it also enables to isolate 
simultaneous faults thanks to its excellent reasoning capability.  In addition, since fault 
isolation is considered as a process of confirming which fault candidate can fully explain 
all the observed abnormal fault symptoms, the decision logic is inherent with 
conservatism.  It is concluded that the data driven model causal graph approach is 
applicable to be integrated into the advanced instrumentation and control system for 
nuclear power plants. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
Although many researches on FDI have been performed in other industries, some 
special issues must be seriously addressed when those experiences are applied to nuclear 
systems (Kaistha and Upadhyaya, 2001). 
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1.2.1 Multi-operational regimes 
 
A nuclear power plant may operate at numerous operational points such as start-
up operation, the change in power demand, the evolution of fuel cycle, performance 
change of components throughout its lifetime, the change in system configuration to meet 
safety requirements, etc.  The designed FDI system must be adaptable to all these 
operational regimes.  For instance, the FDI system should be able to correctly isolate a 
fault under all these operational conditions.  A normal operational transient such as a 
power change, a chemical-volume-control-system startup or shutdown, a steam generator 
blow-down system startup or shutdown, will not trigger a false alarm.  This requires that 
the developed FDI system be able to adaptively adjust its models at all the operational 
points. 
 
1.2.2 Dynamic process behavior  
 
A nuclear power plant always experiences some internal disturbances such as the 
vibration of machinery components and turbulence induced fluctuation, and some 
external disturbances such as the change in power demand.  Therefore, all the state 
variables and/or the measured variables are random variables due to measurement 
disturbances or process disturbances. 
Unlike a process dynamics, an electric circuit exhibits static behavior.  Once an 
electrical circuit is around its operation point, a set of algebraic equations can always be 
found to characterize the relationship of the voltage, the current and the resistance among 
certain nodes.  By systematically checking the consistency of all the algebraic equations, 
it is not difficult to detect a faulty component and isolate it within the circuit. 
For a dynamic process, a set of algebraic equations may not be able to 
characterize the relationship among process variables.  Different initial conditions may 
result in different sets of relationships.  A set of differential equations may usually be 
required to characterize a dynamic system. 
Non-linearity results in additional difficulties in modeling the behavior of a 
dynamic system especially for a nuclear power plant where many nonlinear components 
such as valves, pumps, and controllers with dead band and saturation limits are utilized. 
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The existence of non-linearity will also weaken certain good features of many FDI design 
schemes. 
 
1.2.3 Controller feedback effects  
 
Many distributed feedback controllers are present in a nuclear power plant in 
order to maintain the operation within the designed operation regimes.  Power regulating 
system controls the reactor power such that the power generation from the core matches 
the desired power output of the plant.  Steam generator (SG) water level control system 
controls the feed water control valve position such that SG level is maintained at the set 
point level.  Pressurizer level and pressure control system manipulates the power of 
electric heaters and spray flow rate such that the level and pressure is maintained at the 
set point level. 
Because of feedback controller, a sensor fault or an actuator fault will propagate 
throughout the system.  The fault propagation would create challenges to designing an 
effective FDI system as described below (Dash and Venkatasubramanian, 2000): 
• Data reconciliation approach is not applicable. 
• A minor fault is harder to be detected and isolated. 
• A fault may propagate from one subsystem to another subsystem through a control 
system bridging them. 
• A comparison between set points and measured values after a new steady state 
cannot reveal the occurrence of a sensor fault that is involved in the feedback control 
loop. 
 
1.2.4 Complexity of fault natures  
 
In a large system such as a nuclear plant, the natures of possible faults are very 
complicated because many different components may be involved.  From the FDI 
methodology point of view, these components may be categorized as sensor fault, 
actuator fault, controller fault, and process fault.  With regard to fault effects on the 
measurements, a fault can be classified as additive fault and multiplicative fault.  The 
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time dependence of fault magnitude allows categorizing a fault as abrupt fault, drift fault 
and intermittent fault.  None of the available FDI approaches has acceptable performance 
for all the different types of faults. 
 
1.2.5 Multiple faults 
 
The importance of multiple fault diagnosis should not be underestimated simply 
because its probability is much lower than single faults.  In practice, in a facility such as 
nuclear power plants where safety is always placed at the top, multiple fault diagnosis 
plays a role as important as single fault diagnosis because the risk contribution due to 
multiple faults is much higher than single faults.  A good example that simultaneous 
faults may have significant consequence is the Three-Mile-Island accident.  One of the 
major reasons for multiple faults is a common cause failure.  
Multiple fault diagnostics is challenging because of the interacting nature of most 
faults (Dash and Venkatasubramanian, 2000).  In a complex process, the interaction of 
different faults through a closed control loop would make the fault symptoms more 
difficult to delineate.  System non-linearity makes it even harder to develop analytical 
methods to infer multiple faults simply based on the information contained in single 
faults.  
 
1.2.6 Complex systems  
 
When most FDI techniques are applied to a complex system such as a nuclear 
power plant, some serious difficulties may occur. These difficulties are: 
• Many input variables may be involved in a model such that its accuracy may 
deteriorate significantly. 
• Faults in many subsystems may have the same symptoms. 
• The system interaction or controller interaction among the subsystems may make the 






1.3 Current Solution 
 
1.3.1 Hardware redundancy 
 
Serious consequences of a failure in an instrument system have resulted in great 
conservatism in the design of nuclear power plants.  Hardware redundancy is the 
traditional design scheme to achieve this conservatism.  When an instrument 
measurement is used for system control, a voting logic based on several redundant 
sensors is used to detect and isolate a faulty sensor.  More conservatism has been 
imposed upon the reactor protection systems.  The designed safety-critical control system 
must satisfy: 
• Adequate redundancy. 
• Adequate independence. 
• Physical isolation. 
Adequate redundancy means that multiple sensors or instrumentation channels 
should be used.  Adequate independence means the measurements should be performed 
based upon multiple different principles.  Physical isolation means that the sensors or 
instrumentation channels should be physically isolated.  The second and the third criteria 
aim at defending common cause and common mode failures.  
Hardware redundancy is the most effective way to detect and isolate an 
instrument fault.  However, it is too expensive to extend the philosophy to the whole 
plant including all the auxiliary systems of a nuclear plant.  
 
1.3.2 Reactor spectral analysis 
 
Reactor spectral analysis is a widely used signal processing technology to detect 
and isolate a fault at the component level. 
“Reactor spectral analysis is basically a statistical technique for extracting 
information on reactor system dynamics from the fluctuations of measured 
instrumentation signals during steady state operation.  The small fluctuations of 
measurable process signals are the results of stochastic effects inherent in physical 
process such as heat transfer, boiling, coolant flow turbulence, fission process, structural 
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vibrations and pressure oscillations.  Reactor noise analysis can monitor and assess the 
conditions of technological processes and the instrumentation in the nuclear reactor in a 
non-intrusive, passive way” (Glockler and Tublett, 1995).  
Some successful applications of reactor spectral analysis are summarized as 
follows: 
• Detection of abnormal operation of an instrument or an actuator. 
• On-line monitoring of slowly changing parameters such as fuel-to-coolant heat 
transfer coefficient, sensor degradation. 
• Monitoring reactor stability and stability margin. 
• Vibration analysis of reactor internals and components. 
• Sensor response monitoring and failure detection. 
Reactor spectral analysis is successful in detecting a sensor fault or an actuator 
fault at the component level.  Frequency spectrum analysis assumes that plant 
measurements have a standard frequency spectrum under normal operations and any 
deviation from the standard spectrum indicates an abnormal condition.  One drawback of 
reactor spectral analysis technique is the difficulty in its extension to the level of a system 
or a plant.  For example, if the steam generator water level control system is to be 
monitored, an individual signal-processing unit must be designed for each signal.  
Another drawback of reactor spectral analysis is that the signal characteristics and its 
dependence on operation conditions of the system must be known for the faults of 
concern. 
Modern FDI technique, with analytical redundancy being the representative, has a 
significant feature that the fault signature for a fault is not dependent on system operation 
states.  There would be long-term benefits to the operation of nuclear plants if modern 
FDI technologies can be combined with the traditional reactor spectral analysis. 
 
1.3.3 Analytical redundancy analysis 
 
Analytical redundancy analysis is the foundation of modern FDI.  It borrows the 
idea from hardware redundancy.  It takes advantage of the redundant information 
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inherent in a physical system.  First-principle or data-driven models of fault-free systems 
are built to relate different measurements.  These models can function as soft sensors 
providing an additional redundancy to the measurement systems if none of the model 
inputs is corrupted.  In general, if the relations are violated, a conclusion can be drawn 
that either the process or the measurements are not correct.  This information can be used 
as an indicator to fault detection.  The deviation pattern can further be analyzed for fault 
isolation. 
Analytical redundancy based FDI approaches have some incomparable 
advantages as compared with the traditional methods: 
• The fault signature is independent of fault magnitudes. 
• The fault signature is independent of the operation conditions when a fault occurs. 
Therefore, the fault signature collected once for a fault is sufficient to characterize 
the fault so that it can be isolated.  The application of FDI technology has been 
significantly speeded up since the analytical redundancy was introduced.  It is evident 
that FDI approaches dependent on large amounts of fault data to characterize a fault have 
little value in engineering application.  
However, as a principle, analytical redundancy does not give information about 
how to generate and analyze fault signatures for fault detection and isolation.  Depending 
on the form of system knowledge available and the technical specification of the 
designed FDI system, a variety of implementation strategies exist.  A detailed description 
of these approaches is given in Chapter 2.  In the thesis, the difficulties of utilizing the 
principle on FDI for nuclear power plants are addressed and engineering applicable 
implementation strategies are pursued.  
 
1.4 Technical Approach and Task Definition 
 
The FDI process aims at inferring the root causes from the symptoms observed in 
the measurements.  These symptoms are the basis for an operator to make fault diagnosis. 
The concept of an automatic FDI follows the same logic as a human being in making a 
decision  feature extraction, fault detection and fault isolation.  Feature extraction 
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compresses fault symptoms into a low dimensional space.  Fault detection detects any 
changes in the feature space. Fault isolation classifies the fault signatures into separate 
fault classes.  
Fault symptoms are observed in many measured variables.  They can be 
represented in three ways. The first one is the values of individual measurements.  They 
can be compared with certain set points dependent on operation conditions.  The second 
one is the change of measurements before and after a fault.  A third one, the most 
sophisticated one, is the residuals between measured values and the expected values 
based on some analytical models.  The analytical models can take advantage of the 
redundancy of measurements inherent in a process such as energy conservation, 
momentum conservation, mass conservation, etc.  These models can be considered as 
additional soft sensors available for checking consistency. In the thesis, the third 
representation is used. 
Analytical redundancy approach is used as the basis to develop FDI methods for 
nuclear power plants.  Plant models are built to characterize the relationship among plant 
variables.  Fault signatures are generated as deviations from the models.  Different 
modeling methods and different approaches to defining fault signatures have been studied 
for fault detection and fault isolation. 
A successful FDI system depends on accurate modeling.  Accurate modeling 
implies that the developed model is able to characterize a system with high accuracy. 
However, because a nuclear power plant is so complicated, the available first principle 
models are usually not accurate enough for FDI. For this reason, data driven modeling 
method needs to be used which is able to learn a model from data.  Many data driven 
modeling techniques have been developed such as time series models, Kalman filtering 
algorithms, Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Partial Least Squares (PLS) models, 
Group Method of Data Handling (GMDH) and Artificial Neural Network.  Different 
modeling methods have their own advantages and disadvantages.  In the thesis, PCA and 
ANFIS are utilized. 
Appropriate choice of model structure is essential to building data-driven models. 
For example, if many input variables are involved in a neural network model, it is very 
 12
difficult to train it. Moreover, more input variables need more measurements for training, 
which may cause a delay in fault detection.  In addition, the co-linearity contained in the 
inputs may result in model instability.  In the thesis, it is emphasized to take advantage of 
the available system knowledge so that the most parsimonious model structure can be 
obtained.  
Three different types of simultaneous faults exist (Lee, 1999).  Independent dual 
faults result in symptoms on different variables.  The effects of either fault will be 
different on different variables.  For masked dual faults, the fault symptoms of one of the 
dual faults are a subset of the symptoms of another fault.  For dependent dual faults, one 
of the dual faults competes with the other.  The resulting symptom is unpredictable 
depending on which fault dominates the process.  In this case, neither of the dual faults 
can explain all the symptoms because of mutual amplification and diminution.  
The challenge to multiple fault diagnosis is to appropriately select fault signatures 
in order to avoid fault masking.  For a dual fault whose fault symptom masks one of its 
elemental faults, the only possibility that they can be distinguished is to derive some new 
fault signatures to avoid the fault masking.  Otherwise, the dual fault cannot be isolated 
from its element faults. 
Figure 1.2 shows the overall technical approach taken in this thesis.  Data driven 
modeling such as ANFIS and PCA is used to obtain system models. The system 
knowledge is used to define model structures.  The plant measurements are used to 
parameterize the models.  The process of fault diagnosis involves residual generation and 
residual analysis.  The physical residual is defined as the difference between the 
measured values and their true values.  Based on the available physical models, the 
physical residuals can be approximated as the difference between the measured values 
and the predicted values.  A significant residual can be used to detect a fault.  Three 
methods are used for residual analysis.  If the possible faults and their associated fault 
signatures are known, residual direction and residual structure can be defined to 
characterize a fault for fault isolation.  In the more general case when possible faults are 
not known and their associated fault signatures are not available, cause graph approach 





























Figure 1.2.  Schematic diagram of the overall technical approach. 
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To accomplish the objectives of the thesis based on the technical approach 
discussed above, the following tasks, demonstrating the independent work performed for 
the thesis research are completed: 
• Review modern FDI techniques for process monitoring. 
• Study data driven modeling for a linear static system using PCA. 
• Study data driven modeling for a nonlinear dynamic system using ANFIS. 
• Analyze the fault responses of sensor and actuator faults for PWR steam generator 
system. 
• Implement PCA based FDI to detect and isolate the faults for PWR SG system. 
• Implement structured residual design approach for PWR SG system using ANFIS 
models. 
• Develop data driven model causal graph approach to fault detection and isolation for 
nuclear power plants and apply it to PWR SG system. 
• Design a user interface to demonstrate the efficiency of the designed FDI system.  
 
1.5 Contributions of the Thesis 
 
The contributions of the thesis are as follows: 
 
a) A detailed review of the modern approaches to fault detection and isolation. 
 
Qualitative model based approaches such as Sign Directed Graph (SDG) and 
bond graph approach, and quantitative model based approaches such as parity space 
approach, state space approach, parameter estimation approach, and pattern recognition 
approach are reviewed.  Some comparison study is then performed.  
 
b) Implementation of PCA based FDI algorithm.  
 
A statistical inference method such as PCA algorithm is implemented for fault 
detection and isolation.  This approach is shown to have inherent connection with parity 
space approach.  The linear relationship among measured variables implying analytical 
redundancy can be consistently represented by the eigenvectors corresponding to the 
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trivial components. Any deviation in either model space or residual space indicates a 
fault.  The fault direction jointly defined both in the model space and in the residual space 
provides better fault isolability.  When applied to nuclear plant steam generator system, it 
is able to detect and isolate the selected thirteen single and dual faults. 
 
c) Implementation of ANFIS based FDI algorithm. 
 
Given that the possible faults are known for the plant based on engineering 
judgment, a set of ANFIS models can be built to characterize the nonlinear relationship 
among plant measurements.  Through appropriate choice of model structures, structured 
residuals can be achieved for fault isolation.  When applied to nuclear plant steam 
generator system, it is able to detect and isolate the selected thirteen single and dual 
faults. 
 
d) Development of data driven model causal graph based FDI algorithms 
 
Data driven model causal graph is proposed as a generic approach to fault 
diagnosis for nuclear power plants.  This approach is able to combine the reasoning 
capability of qualitative model based method and the strength in fault resolution of 
quantitative model based method.  The causal graph consists of individual nodes 
representing plant variables connected with quantitative models.  To facilitate on-line 
implementation, ANFIS is used as an adaptive modeling tool.  Fault detection is fulfilled 
by monitoring the residual of each model. Fault isolation is achieved by cause effect 
analysis on the residuals.  The developed approach is demonstrated using data obtained 
from a simulation code for a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) (Doster, 2000).  The 
developed approach is able to detect and isolate single faults and dual faults with fault 







e) Development of a real time demonstration system for FDI 
 
In order to show the effectiveness of the developed FDI methods for nuclear 
power plants, a graphic user interface is developed under the environment of Picasso-3, a 
user interface management system.  The software is able to (1) create a fault by changing 
the fault characteristic parameters; (2) display key parameters on the schematic of a 
reactor system; (3) exhibit residual patterns specific to a fault; (4) trend process variables 
relevant to a fault; and (5) echo FDI results.  The software has integrated SimPWR, a 
reactor system analysis code in FORTRAN, and the FDI code in Matlab, and the C++ 
code to control the GUI.  
 
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
 
The overall objective of the research is to develop an approach to automated FDI 
for nuclear power plant systems.  
In Chapter 2, major modern FDI techniques under the principle of analytical 
redundancy are described.  Qualitative model based approaches such as SDG and bond 
graph, and quantitative model based approaches such as parity space approach, state 
space approach, parameter estimation approach, and pattern recognition approach are 
reviewed.  Some comparison studies in their applications are also made.  
In Chapter 3, the nuclear steam generator system and the available measurements 
are described for a PWR reactor.  Some discussions about how to enumerate faults are 
also made. Some considerations on preparing data for building models are then described. 
Finally, the system responses to these faults are analyzed.  
In Chapter 4, linear PCA algorithms and the relationships between PCA and 
parity space approach for FDI are described.  The PCA algorithm is then implemented to 
detect and isolate the faults for a PWR nuclear steam generator system.  The 2T statistics 
and Q statistics are used for fault detection.  Fault direction is used as fault signatures for 
fault isolation. 
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In Chapter 5, ANFIS is introduced as an advanced tool for modeling nonlinear 
systems. Its structure and learning algorithm are discussed.  ANFIS model based FDI is 
implemented to isolate the selected faults for the steam generator water level system. 
Structured residual design approach proves to be an efficient method for fault isolation. 
The approaches to structured residuals are studied.  
In Chapter 6, data driven model causal graph is developed as a generic approach 
to fault detection and isolation for nuclear power plants.  The structure of a model causal 
graph is described.  The reasoning algorithms are then described in order to achieve fault 
isolation.  It has also been shown that the causal graph is in full agreement with efficient 
data driven modeling.  The developed approach is successful when applied to nuclear 
steam generator system. 
Chapter 7 describes a graphical user interface and its design to demonstrate the 
efficiency of the designed FDI system. 










This chapter describes the principles of fault detection and isolation through a 
systematic literature review.  
The FDI approaches differ in what kind of knowledge is used and how the 
knowledge is used.  In broad sense, FDI approaches can be quantitative knowledge based 
or qualitative knowledge based.  Depending on how to develop models, FDI approaches 
can be first-principle model based or historical data driven model based.  In terms of how 
to use the knowledge, many FDI approaches exist.  The major approaches are reviewed in 
this chapter.  
 
2.1 Data Reconciliation  
 
Data reconciliation is a technique used for detecting and isolating a measurement 
error or a process fault that results in measurements inconsistent with energy balance 
equations, mass balance equations, and other balance equations.  Its goal is to reconstruct 
the measurements so that the balance equations are not violated.  This approach provides 
an efficient way to handle a large system (Albuquerque and Biegler, 1996). 
For a given system under fault conditions, the measurement vector y can be 
represented as a function of the actual values of some system variables denoted by the 
vector z , which is given by: 
 yzfy ∆+= )(  
where   
y∆ = measurement error and fault error. 
 The actual values of the system variables satisfy certain constraint relationship, 
which is given by: 
 0),( =zcg  
where 
c  = some other system variables. 
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Data reconciliation aims at determining a vector *z  such that 
 *)((*))((*)( 1 zfyRzfyzJ −−= −   
is minimized on condition that 
 0*),( =zcg   
where  
R = a weighting matrix reflecting the accuracy of different measurements. 
The reconstructed measurements can then be obtained by: 
 *)(* zfy =  
Therefore, *yy −  can be used as fault signatures for fault detection and isolation. 
Data reconciliation approach is powerful in solving a large system with co-
linearity.  However, it is only applicable for steady state conditions since the involved 
optimization may become unmanageable during transient process.  Therefore, there might 
be some undesirable time lag for fault detection and isolation.  In addition, for nuclear 
power plants where many controllers are involved, the steady state information may not 
be enough to isolate some faults.  
 
2.2 Model Based Approach 
 
The foundation of model-based approach is analytical redundancy.  It assumes 
that first principle or data-driven models can be used to represent the relationships among 
plant variables during fault free conditions.  These models provide the same function as 
some redundant soft sensors.  The physical residuals can then be approximated as the 
difference between the measured values and the model prediction.  A significant residual 
can be used to detect a fault and the residuals can be analyzed for fault isolation. Model 
based approaches differ in how to generate and analyze residuals.  
 
2.2.1 Parity space approach 
 
For a given system, the relationship between the measurement vector y and the 
state vector x is given by: 
   yCxy ∆+=        
where 
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y∆ = measurement error. 
C = system matrix. 
xxx ∆+= *  
x∆ = disturbance of state variables. 
Parity space approach (Chow and Willsky 1984, and Frank, 1990) aims at 
generating a residual vector that is influenced only by measurement error.  The physical 
residual o(t) of the system has this property, which is given by: 
*o(t) Cxy −=  
This physical residual is not directly available.  Therefore, a parity vector must be 
introduced. The parity vector p(t) is obtained through a linear transformation TV of the 
physical residuals given by: 
 )()( xCyVtoVp TT ∆+∆==   (2.1) 
The parity vector will not depend on the disturbance of the state variables if the 
following constraint is imposed: 
 0=CxV T  
Consequently, 
 0=∆xCV T  
Therefore, 
 yVp T ∆=  
Hence, the parity vector p is influenced only by the measurement error.  It is 
defined in the parity space that is usually smaller than the original measurement space.  A 
nonzero component of the parity vector indicates a faulty measurement. 
For example, a system has five measurements and three state variables.  The 
dimension of the measurement vector y is 5 by 1, the dimension of the measurement 
matrix C is 5 by 3, and the dimension of the parity vector will be 2 by 1 since the system 
has two linear dependent relationships among the measurements if the rank of the matrix 
is three.  Therefore, two of the five measurements can be derived from the other 
measurements.  Correspondingly, the dimension of the matrix V is 5 by 2. 
Such a FDI approach has a great advantage in its robustness to disturbances. 
However, the linear transformation approach is not applicable for a non-linear system.  
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2.2.2  State estimation approach 
 
State estimation approach is considered as a more general approach than parity 
space approach.  When the residuals are generated for fault detection and isolation, the 
simplest model to estimate a measured signal is identical to the plant model functioning 
as a simulator in parallel without using the information of the system outputs.  However, 
because the simulator type of model is an open loop system, the solution may not be 
stable or convergent if the plant operates beyond its designed region. 
In order to overcome the problem, the state space model is introduced in the FDI. 








For fault free condition, a state observer with feedback matrix H can be designed 








           (t)x̂-x(t)(t) =ε  approaches zero asymptotically. 
  (t)HC)-(A1)(t εε =+  approaches zero asymptotically. 
where  
)(te = output estimation error. 
)(tε = state estimation error. 
If an additive fault )(tf  occurs in the system, the dynamic behavior of the system 









Then the output error is given by: 
)()()( 2 tfDtCte += ε  
Both state estimation error and the output error are not zero and show dynamic 
behavior after a fault occurs.  Both can be used for fault detection.  To generate stable 
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and sensitive residuals, the feedback matrix H must be carefully designed.  State 
estimation error vectors can also be designed with directional characteristics for fault 
isolation (Jones, 1973).  
Because the dynamic behavior of state estimation error and the output error are 
different from )(1 tfD  and )(2 tfD  if the signals are affected by additional noise, it is a 
challenging task to design the feedback matrix such that the estimation error is sensitive 
to a fault and insensitive to noise. 
 
2.2.3 Parameter estimation approach 
 
Some process parameters can be estimated using some input variables and/or 
some output variables.  The difference between the normal process parameters and the 
estimated parameters can then be used for fault detection and diagnosis (Chen and Patton, 
1993). 
Given a single input single output (SISO) system of order n defined in the matrix 
form as follows: 
 θ')( xty =  (2.5) 
where 
θ  = parameters related to the linear model. 
)](),...1(),(),...1([' ntutuntytyx −−−−=  
The least square estimate of θ  can be computed as: 
 yxx 1)'( −=θ  (2.6) 
If the knowledge is known about what is the mapping between a fault and the 
parameter θ , the values found from the measurements through system identification can 
then be used for fault isolation. 
Parameter estimation is a powerful approach to detecting and isolating a process 
fault for a linear system.  However, for a nonlinear system, it may be very difficult to 
estimate the parameters with enough accuracy and define a one-to-one relationship 
between a parameter change and a fault in the physical process. 
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2.3 Pattern Recognition 
 
Statistical inference and neural network are two major applications of pattern 
recognition techniques in fault detection and isolation.  The task of pattern recognition is 
to extract some features and set up a mapping between a class of objects and their 
features.  This is in conformance with the task of fault diagnosis. If appropriate fault 
signatures can be obtained to characterize fault symptoms, they can then be used as 
features to infer the fault. 
Mathematically, the principle of fault detection and isolation based on pattern 









FSPFPSFP  (2.7) 
where 
)|( SFP i  = the probability that a fault with symptoms S is Fi. 
)( iFP = the prior probability of Fi. 
)|( iFSP = the conditional probability of  symptom S given fault Fi. 
Each fault defines a specific region in the feature space.  For a given observation, 
the likelihood of the observation falling into each region corresponding to all the possible 
faults in the feature space can be computed.  The observation is assigned to the fault class 
that gives the largest likelihood. 
Quite a few statistical methods such as PCA, PLS, multivariate auto-regression 
modeling can be used to capture the features.  The critical point to feature extraction is to 
compress the information describing the relationship among variables in a reduced 
dimensional space without significant loss of information.  
Artificial neural network is another powerful technique to perform pattern 
recognition. It is trained such that all the fault patterns are memorized.  When a new fault 
comes, the network is then able to classify its pattern into correct fault class. 
Pattern recognition based FDI has the advantage in its possibility of on-line 
implementation.  However, a large amount of training data is needed in order to 
characterize the features of the possible faults.  For nuclear power plants where many 
 24
components are involved, it is unrealistic to collect such data and define fault 
characteristics for the possible faults of interest.  
 
2.4 Sign Directed Graph 
 
A signed directed graph (SDG) is a graphic representation of the causal 
relationship among plant variables.  In a SDG, these variables are individual nodes and 
some directed arcs are used to represent the causal relations between the nodes.  A node 
can take qualitative values, denoted as 0, +, and –, which correspond to nominal, high and 
low, respectively.  The directed arc signs may take + or – depending on whether the 
causal relation is in the same direction or in the opposite direction.  A root node is linked 
with at least one effect node but is not connected to any causal node.  The process of fault 
diagnosis using SDG is to find a single path from a root node to all the abnormal 
measurement nodes, which satisfies the qualitative constraints defined by the signed 
directed arcs for the system (Lee, 1999). 
The process of single fault diagnosis using the SDG method can be summarized 
as the following steps (Vedam and Venkatasubramanian, 1995): 
• Identify all the fault candidates by tracking consistent arcs from the effect nodes to 
the causal nodes starting from all the abnormal measurement nodes. 
• For each of the fault candidates, check if an effective causal path exists to explain the 
observed abnormal measurements. 
• A fault candidate is confirmed to be the fault origin if reasonable causal paths can be 
defined to interpret all the abnormal measurements. 
The SDG method has a distinct feature in fault diagnosis in finding out all the 
possible root causes capable of explaining all the abnormal measurements.  
In order to represent explicitly the knowledge of the system behavior contained in 
SDG, a rule based SDG approach to FDI has been developed (Kramer and Palowitch, 
1987).  The rule base variation is more concise and can be easily incorporated into an 
expert diagnostic system. 
Recently fuzzy-SDG has been developed (Zakarian and Kusiak, 2000).  A node of 
fuzzy-SDG is a variable that may take several fuzzy values such as low, medium low, 
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normal, medium high and high.  A branch represents the causal-effect direction and 








++ =→  (2.8) 
where 
1+jRx  , jRx = the value range of node 1+jx  and jx . 












The architecture of fuzzy-SDG not only has the good features of traditional SDG 
methods but also has the learning capability from data.  
 
2.5 Bond Graph  
 
When a fault happens, the system may involve some dynamic behavior because of 
external disturbances and control changes.  In most cases, a model developed under fault 
free conditions may not be able to track the model changes caused by faults.  However, 
the transient behavior caused by faults contains rich information for fault isolation. In 
order to make most use of this information, a diagnosis inference method, bond graph 
approach has been proposed to model the dynamic behavior, reason about the temporal 
attributes of system parameters and relate behavior changes to component parameters 
(Mosterman and Biswas, 1997): 
Bond graph is a causal behavior graph developed for qualitative modeling 
(Amsterdam, 1992).  In a bond graph, the individual nodes represent effort variables in 
the system.  The directed arcs represent the relations between flow and effort variables. 
The characterization of the relationship is achieved in analogy to some electrical element. 
For a resistance element, the relationship is characterized with the inverse of its electric 
resistance. For a capacity element, the relationship is characterized with the inverse of the 
time integral of its capacity.  Because a bond graph model makes it possible to keep track 
of the magnitude change and change rates of all the measured variables, the temporal 
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response of a fault manifested in measurements can then be used as fault signatures for 
fault isolation during transients.  
The diagnostic procedure using bond graph is summarized as follows (Mosterman 
and Biswas, 1997): 
• Generate fault candidates by propagating the observed values backward to some root 
node.  
• Predict the fault behavior for each fault candidate and make a comparison between 
the predicted values and measured values. 
• If all the measurements are consistent with the predicted values, the candidate fault is 
chosen as the true fault. Otherwise, the candidate fault is rejected. 
This chapter has reviewed the major modern approaches to fault detection and 
isolation developed in other industries.  Analytical redundancy has been recognized as 
the foundation of modern FDI approaches.  Under this principle, qualitative model and 
quantitative model based approaches can be derived.  Data reconciliation approach, 
model based approach and pattern recognition approach are quantitative model based 
approaches.  Sign directed graph approach and bond graph approach are qualitative 
model based approach.  The former approach has better resolution in fault isolation and 
the latter has better reasoning capability.  In the thesis, accurate models required by 
quantitative model based approach will be achieved by data driven modeling such as 
PCA and ANFIS.  Furthermore, in order to organically combine the reasoning capability 
of qualitative model based approaches and the good resolution of quantitative model 
based approaches, data driven model causal graph will be developed as a generic 




Chapter 3  
 




The U-tube steam generator (UTSG) water level control system of a typical four 
loop PWR is selected to study the FDI methods. 
 
3.1 Description of nuclear SG system 
 
The SG water level control system in PWR has a three-element controller to 
control the water level in the steam generator as is shown in Figure 3.1.  The three 
elements are steam flow, feed water flow, and steam generator water level.  The reference 
water level is a function of the turbine load and the steam dump rate through steam dump 
valves.  The SG level error signal is the measured level minus the reference level.  The 
flow mismatch error is the fractional steam flow rate minus the fractional feed water flow 
rate.  The combination of the SG level error and the flow mismatch error is used as the 
input to the controller.  The controller output is used to manipulate the feed water control 
valve position.  Because the main control purpose of the SG level control system is to 
control the water level, the level error has been multiplied by a gain in order to dominate 
the flow mismatch error signal.  In addition, feed water temperature is used to take into 
account its effect on SG level. 
Another control system involved in the nuclear SG system is the control over the 
speed of the main feed water pump.  The objective of this control system is to maintain 
the feed water control valve position approximately at its midpoint so that the best control 
performance can be achieved.  The system obtains the collected steam flow rate from all 
the steam generators and generates a reference pressure difference.  The error signal is 
generated from the difference between the reference pressure difference and the actual 
pressure difference between the collected steam line and the collected feed water line. 



































Figure 3.1.  SG water level control system.  
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measured at the upstream of feed water control valve.  The pressure on the steam line is 
measured at the downstream of the main steam isolation valve.  
 
3.2 Available Measurements 
 
Table 3.1 shows the major available measurements relevant to the FDI task for the 
steam generator system of a nuclear power plant. 
 
3.3 Enumeration of Single Faults 
 
For a large system where thousands of components may be involved, it is usually 
difficult to know all the possible faults and incorporate them into a fault dictionary. 
However, in nuclear power plants, the sophisticated reliability analysis can provide rich 
information about the possible faults from engineering point view at a specified operation 
lifetime.  In addition, probabilistic risk assessment can provide detailed information about 
the faults of safety concern under different operation conditions.  Therefore, it is still of 
great value to develop FDI methods with the assumption that the faults can be 
enumerable.  In the thesis, the approaches described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 deal with 
the situation where the possible faults are known.  Data-driven model causal graph 
approach developed in Chapter 6 deals with the situation where the possible faults are 
unknown. 
 
3.4 Enumeration of Simultaneous Faults 
 
 Even when the possible single faults are known, their combination will generate 
many possible simultaneous faults.  To keep the number of possible simultaneous faults 
manageable, a common approach is to ignore those simultaneous faults with very low 
probability based on engineering experiences.  However, these engineering practices are 
usually very subjective and even so there still might remain a very large number of 
possible simultaneous faults.  
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Table 3.1.  Available measured variables for the FDI of nuclear SG system 
1 Thermal power 23 FCV1 position 
2 Reference temperature 24 FCV1 controller output  
3 Programmed reference 
temperature 
25 SG1 WR indicator 
4 Primary pressure 26 SG 1 NR indicator 
4 Cold leg 1 temperature 27 FCV2 position 
5 Cold leg 2 temperature 28 FCV2 controller output  
6 Hot leg 1 temperature 29 SG NR reference 
7 Hot leg 2 temperature 30 SG2 WR indicator 
8 Pressurizer pressure 31 SG2 NR indicator 
9 Pressurizer heater output 32 SG1 temperature 
10 Pressurizer level 33 SG2 temperature 
11 Pressurizer reference level 34 TCV1 position 
12 Pressurizer spray flow rate 35 TCV1 flow rate 
13 Charging flow are 36 TCV2 position 
14 Letdown flow rate 37 TCV2 flow rate 
15 Surging flow rate 38 TCV3 position 
16 SG1 pressure 39 TCV3 flow rate 
17 SG2 pressure 40 TCV4 position 
18 Feed water temperature 41 TCV4 flow rate 
19 SG1 steam flow rate 42 Turbine header pressure 
20 SG2 steam flow rate 43 Turbine output 
21 Feed water flow rate to SG1 44 Turbine load 
22 Feed water flow rate to SG2 45 Turbine RPM 
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In the thesis, qualitative knowledge based FDI is proposed to limit the number of 
possible simultaneous faults.  For an online FDI system, the qualitative knowledge based 
FDI module is used to generate only a few fault candidates and their reference fault 
signatures are generated on-line using a simulator in parallel with the plants.  In fact, only 
one simulation is required to generate data so as to characterize a fault if analytical 
redundancy based FDI approach instead of pattern recognition method is used. 
Qualitative knowledge based FDI needs to have certain system knowledge in 
order to obtain system causal graph.  However, this is not a major problem for nuclear 
power plants, where the system responses to significant faults can be available from a 
variety of sources such as system design manual, system operation manual or standard 
safety analysis report.   
The following section shows an example on how to use sign directed graph, a 
typical qualitative knowledge based approach to generate the reasonable combination of 
simultaneous faults for the steam generator system.  
Figure 3.2 shows the sign directed graph for the steam generator system in which 
three single faults, feed water flow meter offset fault, SG level sensor offset fault, and 
steam flow meter offset fault, are considered.  Correspondingly, only three root nodes 
(node 1, node 8 and node 11) and the other eight process nodes are involved.  In the 
graph, the cause effect relationships between variables are represented by the positive and 
the negative directional connections.  Because a feedback control loop is involved, the 
directional variation of the effect variable during the transients induced by a disturbance 
on the causal variable is used to represent the cause effect relationship. 
The fault candidates can be identified simply by tracking consistent arcs from the 
effect nodes to the causal nodes starting from all the abnormal measurement nodes.  As 
an example, if the observed symptom is that the feed water flow indicator is low and the 
SG narrow range level indicator is high, node 2 takes a negative value and node 7 takes a 
positive value.  If the negative value of node 2 is back propagated immediately to node 1, 










• Node 1: Feed water flow meter offset
• Node 2: Feed water flow indicator
• Node 3: FCV position
• Node 4: Feed water flow rate
• Node 5: SG mass
• Node 6: SG level
• Node 7: SG level indicator
• Node 8: SG level sensor offset
• Node 9: SG steam flow
• Node 10: SG steam flow indicator
• Node 11: SG steam flow meter offset
• Positive connection: in red arrows






















If the negative value of node 2 is back propagated to the root node 11 along node 
4, node 3, the node 10, a negative steam flow meter offset can be identified as a possible 
root cause.  If the negative value of node 2 is back propagated to node 8 along the node 4, 
the node 3, the node 7, a positive steam generator level sensor offset fault can be 
identified as a possible root cause.  
If the positive value of node 7 is back propagated immediately to the root node 8, 
a positive steam generator level sensor offset fault can be identified as a possible root 
cause.  If it is back propagated to the root node 11 along node 6, node 5, node 4, node 3, 
and node 10, a positive steam flow meter offset fault can be identified as a possible root 
cause. 
In the sign directed graph method, fault localization is a process of determining 
one or several root nodes whose predicted fault symptoms are in agreement with the 
measured fault symptoms.  In the example, after the possible fault candidates have been 
identified, the fault symptoms can then be predicted by propagating forward from the root 
nodes to the measured or the unmeasured nodes.  If there is only single fault in the 
system, a positive SG level offset fault will be isolated as the fault origin since it is able 
to fully explain the observed fault symptoms. However, if dual faults are considered, the 
possibility of a negative feed water flow meter offset fault cannot be excluded since its 
combination with a positive steam generator level sensor offset may also cause the same 
symptoms.  
From this example, it can be seen that the number of possible simultaneous faults 
can be significantly reduced based on a preliminary SDG analysis. In fact, three single 
faults and three simultaneous faults need to be considered without SDG analysis. 
 
3.5 Scope of the Studied Faults 
 
Although SDG can be introduced to generate fault candidates for both single and 
dual faults, the focus of the thesis is on how to detect and isolate these single faults and 
dual faults. 
To design a FDI algorithm that is able to deal with simultaneous faults, the 
number of the faults has to be manageable from research point of view.  Only those 
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simultaneous faults with meaningful probability in engineering sense have been taken 
into account.  For instance, triple faults occur with much lower probability than dual 
faults.  It is usually enough to incorporate only dual faults. Moreover, inappropriate 
inclusion of simultaneous faults may degrade the performance of a designed FDI system 
since not all the possible simultaneous faults can be isolated.  Raich and Cinar, 1996 
reported that a random variation fault is highly likely to mask with another random fault 
or another step fault or a ramp fault.  Therefore, random variation fault is not taken into 
account in order to avoid fault masking due to inadequate information.   
The following single faults and dual faults are defined in the FDI design for the 
steam generator system: 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault. 
• Steam flow meter offset fault. 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault and steam flow meter offset fault. 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault and SG level sensor offset fault. 
• Steam flow meter offset fault and SG level sensor offset fault. 
• SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault and SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault and FCV offset fault. 
• Steam flow meter offset fault and FCV position offset fault. 
• Feed water control valve position offset fault. 
• SG pressure sensor offset fault and SG level sensor offset fault. 
• SG level sensor offset fault. 
• Steam flow meter offset fault and SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
 
3.6 Data Preparation for Modeling 
 
In order to develop appropriate data driven models with enough accuracy for fault 
detection and isolation, the quality of data preparation is very important.  The collected 
data must cover the entire normal operation range and the entire faulty operation range. 
 35
Otherwise, the data driven models will perform extrapolation and the prediction will be 
unreliable. 
The following operation conditions are considered in order to prepare the data for 
SG modeling: 
• Slow power transients at forty power levels beginning from 20% to 100% at an 
interval of 2% power increase. 
• Large power transients from 20% to 100% power level. 
• Large power transients from 100% to 20% power level. 
The data are collected during slow transient conditions because such data are 
appropriate to build dynamic models. For a system with feed back control loop, the static 
information may not enough to detect some faults within the control loop.  In addition, it 
is difficult to generate sufficient amount of data to build data driven models if only steady 
state data are used.  The data collected during large power transients are used to build 
data driven models to predict the controller output and the control valve position. 
When a FDI system is developed for a real application, more process conditions 
need to be covered.  Some of the conditions may be different stages of the reactor life 
cycle, different ranges of heat transfer rate from the primary side to the secondary side, 
etc. 
A short sampling interval makes it possible to detect a fault faster, but it may 
bring some high frequency noises into the data and result in time dependence between 
adjacent observations.  This dependence may result in a more complex model to 
characterize the system behavior. The sampling time is chosen to be 1 second. 
The fault data are generated for all the considered faults at 100% power level 
under the following conditions: 
• Drift faults with drift rate at 1%/hr, 2%/hr, 3%/hr, -1%/hr, -2%/hr, -3%/hr. 
• Bias faults with offset at 1%, 2%, 3%, -1%, -2%, -3%. 
For both the drift faults and the bias fault, the data set for only one fault 
magnitude is used to provide reference fault signatures and all the other data sets are used 
to test the reliability of the developed FDI approaches.  Although most of the test cases 
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are based on 100% full power, one special test case is designed to show the performance 
of the developed FDI algorithm in dealing with a fault at another power level 80%. 
 
3.7 Fault Response Analysis 
 
Before a FDI system is designed, it is necessary to have some qualitative fault 
response analysis.  This analysis facilitates to determine the structure of the models to be 
developed.  The value range of the affected variables can also be examined after the 
faults of interest occur so that the developed data driven models have reliable 
generalization capability.  In addition, the analysis can help to examine the effects of 
controller feedback.  
 
3.7.1 Feed water flow meter positive offset fault 
 
When the feed water flow meter has a positive offset fault, the initial responses 
are as follows: 
• The indicated feed water flow meter increases. 
• The FCV valve position decreases. 
• The SG water level decreases. 
• The SG pressure does not change. 
• The steam flow rate has a very slight increase.   
The reason why steam flow rate does not change significantly is that the steam 
flow rate is mainly determined by the power demand. 
When a new steady state is reached, the system responses are as follows: 
• The indicated feed water flow rate increases. 
• The FCV position returns to its initial level. 
• The SG water level decreases. 
• The SG pressure does not change. 
• The steam flow rate returns to its initial value.   
 After the new steady state, the steam flow rate is equal to the actual feed water 
flow rate instead of the measured feed water flow rate.  The error signal to the controller 
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becomes zero.  This is achieved by the fact that the SG water level has decreased 
although the indicated feed water flow rate has increased.  To maintain the constant 
reactor power output during the fault, the steam flow does not change. 
 In the process, the indicated feed water flow rate will be consistently higher than 
the true value.  A model capable of calculating the true value of feed water flow rate can 
be used to isolate the feed water flow meter fault.  
 
3.7.2 Steam water flow meter positive offset fault 
 
When the steam flow meter has a positive offset fault, the initial responses are as 
follows: 
• The feed water flow meter increases. 
• The FCV valve position increases. 
• The SG water level increases. 
• The SG pressure does not change. 
• The indicated steam flow rate increases.   
When a new steady state is reached, the system responses are as follows: 
• The feed water flow rate returns to its initial level. 
• The FCV valve position returns to its initial level. 
• The SG water level increases. 
• The SG pressure does not change. 
• The indicated steam flow rate increases.   
 After the new steady state, the actual steam flow rate instead of the indicated 
steam flow rate is equal to the feed water flow rate.  The error signal to the controller 
becomes zero.  This is achieved by the fact that the SG water level increases although the 
indicated steam water flow rate has increased.  
 In the process, the indicated steam flow rate will be consistently higher than the 
actual value.  A model capable of calculating the actual value of the steam flow rate can 
be used to isolate the steam flow meter fault.  
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3.7.3 Steam generator pressure sensor offset fault 
 
When the steam generator pressure sensor has a positive offset fault, the speed of 
the main feed water pump will change.  The proportional integral controller of main feed 
water pump uses the pressure difference between the steam line and the feed water line as 
input to control the valve position of feed water control valve approximately at its 
midpoint.  The initial response to SG pressure sensor positive offset fault is that the feed 
water flow rate will increase due to the increase in the feed water pump speed. To be 
followed is that the SG water level will increase.  After a new steady state is reached, the 
feed water flow rate will go back to its initial level.  The steam flow rate does not have 
significant changes.  The SG level will go back to its initial level after the new steady 
state is reached. 
 
3.7.4 Feed water control valve position fault 
 
When the feed water control valve has a positive offset fault during its actuation 
when a command is received from the controller output, the initial responses are as 
follows: 
• The feed water flow meter increases. 
• The FCV valve position increases. 
• The SG water level increases. 
• The SG pressure decreases. 
• The steam flow rate doe not change.   
When a new steady state is reached, the system responses are as follows: 
• The feed water flow rate does not change. 
• The actual FCV valve position returns to its initial value. 
• The SG water level increases. 
• The SG pressure does not change. 
• The steam flow rate does not change.   
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When the feed water control valve has a positive offset fault, the initial response 
is that the feed water flow rate increases.  The controller will then reduce the open-width 
of the feed water control valve using the mismatch signal between the FCV flow rate and 
the SG steam flow rate.  To be followed is that the SG water level increases and the FCV 
controller will reduce the open-width of FCV valve position again.  In the end, the FCV 
flow rate and the FCV valve position return to their initial levels.  
The SG level changes as the integral effect of the change of the FCV flow rate 
during the fault progression.  The SG final level is greater than the initial level. 
Because the command has a positive bias, the controller output will be negative so 
that the actual actuation of the feed water control valve is zero because the SG water level 
has increased when a new steady state is reached. 
 
3.7.5 SG narrow range level sensor fault 
 
When the SG narrow range level sensor has a positive offset fault, the initial 
responses are as follows: 
• The feed water flow meter decreases. 
• The FCV valve position decreases. 
• The indicated SG water level increases. 
• The SG pressure has a slight decrease since the actual water level decreases. 
• The steam flow rate has a very slight increase.   
When a new steady state is reached, the system responses are as follows: 
• The feed water flow rate returns approximately to its initial level. 
• The FCV valve position returns approximately to its initial level. 
• The indicated SG water level returns to its initial level. 
• The SG pressure has a slight decrease. 
• The steam flow rate returns approximately to its initial level.   
When the steam generator level sensor has a positive offset fault, the initial action 
of the controller is to reduce the open-width of the feed water control valve.  The feed 
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water flow rate decreases at the beginning and tends to go back to its initial level in the 
end.  
The steam generator indicated level would go back approximately to its initial 
level after steady state is reached.  However, the SG true level would be lower than its 
initial level with an offset equal to the magnitude of the sensor bias as is shown in Figure 
3.3.  In the fault process, the reactor power load does not change and nor does the SG 
narrow range reference level.  After the new steady state, the steam flow rate is equal to 
the feed water flow rate.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the fault responses to the five single faults.  Based on the 
table, if only steady state information is used, controller output signal must be used in 
order to detect FCV position fault. Process redundancy is not sufficient in order to detect 


















Figure 3.3.  SG Level measurement responding to SG NR level sensor fault. 
 
Table 3.2.  Summary of the steady state responses to the single faults 
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Chapter 4  
 
Principal Component Analysis for Fault Diagnosis 
 
 
4.1 PCA Algorithms 
 
From the point of view of data, PCA is a dimensional reduction method.  The 
original data can be represented in a lower dimensional space without significant loss of 
the variability.  From the modeling point of view, PCA transforms correlated variables 
into uncorrelated ones and determines the linear combinations with large and low 
variability (Flury, 1988).  
Before the original data are transformed into a lower dimensional space, they are 
mean centered because only the variability of the data is of interest.  The data are 
standardized with unit variance so that equal weights are given to all the variables as far 
as their variability is concerned. 
For the original data matrix X associated with n observations and m measured 
variables, the first principal component is obtained by finding out a linear transformation 
column vector 1P  such that the scores 1t  of the original data along this component has 
maximized variance. In mathematical term, this is given by: 
 11 XPt =  
 1111111 ''')var()var( PPXPXPXPtE Σ====    is maximized. 
where 








=S  sample covariance matrix. 
 An additional constraint on the transformation column vector is to normalize its 
length. 
 In order to maximize the variance of 1t with the above constraints, we can set the 
derivative of 1E to zero and include a Lagrange multiplier 1λ  to ensure the constraint is 










 111 PP λ=Σ  (4.1) 
In the above derivation, we have used the formula for the derivative of a matrix with 














The variance of the original data along the first principal component is then given by: 
 
 111111 ')var( λλ === PPtE  (4.2) 
Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2) show that the transformation vector to obtain 
the first principal component is actually the eigenvector of XX ' corresponding to its 
maximum eigenvalue.  
In order to obtain the thj principal component, the following constraints must be 
satisfied (Jackson, 1991): 
kkkk PPtE Σ== ')var(  is maximized 
1' =kk PP  
kXP is orthogonal to jXP  for 1....2,1 −= kj  
 In order to maximize kE with the above constraints, we can set the derivative of 
kE to zero, include a Lagrange multiplier kλ  to ensure 1' =jk PP  and 1−j  Lagrange 






















φλφλ  (4.3) 
If we left-multiply Equation (4.3) by 'jP  for 1....2,1 −= kj  and notice the orthogonal 
property of jP , then we have: 
0=jφ  for 1,.......2,1 −= kj  
kkk PP λ=Σ  
kkE λ=  
If the score vectors are combined, then we have: 
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XPT =  
The matrix P is constructed by the columns of the eigenvectors of XX ' whose 
left-columns correspond to larger eigenvalues than the right columns.  The matrix P is 
called loading matrix in the sense that the original data can be loaded to a lower 
dimensional if its dimension is chosen to be fewer than the number of variables in the 
original data. 
The loading matrix can be used to reconstruct the original data without loss of 
much information given by:  
 'TPX =  (4.4) 
From the equation, it can be seen that all the information contained in the original 
data set has been compressed into the loading matrix. If the loading matrix is known, the 
original data can then be reconstructed. 
 
4.2 PCA for Fault Detection 
 
During normal operation, the sample covariance of the measured data is governed 
by the physics in the process.  Its structure will change if a fault occurs in the process.  If 
a PCA model is used to describe the covariance structure of the measured data for the 
fault free condition, a fault can be detected when the model cannot explain the new 
observed data.  Two cases may make the PCA model fail to explain the new data.  The 
first case is that the new observation deviates from the mean of the normal operation 
defined by the effective region of the PCA model in the score space.  The other case is 
that the residual of the model has changed significantly.  The model residual represents 
the noise and the redundant information of a system.  If a fault occurs, the characteristics 
of the noise and the redundancy are expected to change.  
 
4.2.1 2T  statistics 
 
If the score of a new observation is significantly outside the region defined by the 
scores of the fault free data, a fault may have occurred.  If the scores of the fault free data 
satisfy multivariate normal distribution, the decision ellipse can be given by: 
 22' αTTT <Σ









=  (4.6) 
and 
p= number of  variables. 
n= number of observations. 
α = significance level. 
The disadvantage of T2 statistics is that it may be oversensitive to the small 
elements of aΣ and result in high false alarm rate. 
 
4.2.2 Q statistics 
 
Q statistics can be used to test whether the principal component model can still 
explain a new observation.  The random variable used for this testing is the sum squared 
error R of the original PCA model defined by the following equation: 
 rrR '=  (4.7) 
where  
 xPPIr )'( −=  
If the sum squared error measuring the total sum of the variation in the residual 
space exceeds the Q threshold, it indicates that the original PCA model cannot explain 
the new data.  The threshold of Q statistics αQ  is defined as follows (Jackson and 
Mudholkar, 1979) 
 dczbaQ )( +=α  (4.8) 
where 
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4.3 PCA for Fault Identification 
 
The task of fault identification is to determine what are the most affected 
variables once a fault happens.  These variables are usually most relevant to fault 
diagnosis.  Fault identification is useful because it can help operators focus their attention 
on a reduced number of variables.  The out-of-status score can be approximated by 










iσ = singular value, si ,......2,1= . 
=s  the number of scores considered to be responsible for the out-of-control status. 
=k  the number of principal components. 
The contribution of one original variable to one of the out-of-control scores can 











jiC , = the contribution of  variable jx to the out-of-control scores it . 











iC = the contribution of  variable jx to the out-of-control status. 
The fault identification measure can also be defined based on the normalized 

















=  (4.9) 
 
4.4 PCA fault Isolation Versus Parity Space Approach 
 
Gertler et al (1999) reported that there is an inherent consistency between PCA 
approach and parity space approach when used for fault isolation.  A linear static system 












BtAuty )()(  
where 
)(ty = the observed outputs. 
)(tu = the controlled inputs or the measured inputs. 
u∆ = the disturbances or the unknown faults related to )(tu . 
y∆ = the disturbances or unknown faults related to )(ty . 
A and B= known system matrices. 
If we combine all the measured variables )(tu  and )(ty  in a column vector 
denoted as )(tx , a set of residuals can then be defined as: 
 xBtxIAto ∆=−= )(],[)(  (4.10) 
When PCA is performed, the residual vector is given by: 
 ))(('))('()(')()( txxQQxxPPIxxPPxxto ∆+=∆+−=∆+−∆+=  (4.11) 
where 
P = the eigenvectors that span the principal component space. 
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Q = the eigenvectors that span the residual space. 
 In the above derivation, we have used the property of orthonornal matrices: 
IQQPP =+ ''  
 In addition, we have assumed that the variances of the scores on the eigenvectors 
corresponding to trivial components are approximately zero: 
0)'var()var( ≈= xQti  
 Correspondingly, if the original data are mean centered, then 
0' =xQ  
Therefore,  
)(')( txQQto ∆=  
The residual vector )(to  generated in this way can be directly used as a parity 
vector for fault isolation since any nonzero component of the parity vector corresponds to 
only one faulty measurement. Such a FDI approach has great advantages in its easy 
implementation.  However, the linear PCA algorithm and the method of obtaining 
residual vector for fault isolation are not applicable for a non-linear system.  
 
4.5 PCA Fault Isolation Based on Fault Direction 
 
Yoon and MacGregor (2001) reported that the fault directions both in the model 
space and in the residual space should be used in order to isolate a complex fault. 
 If a fault occurs in a control loop, the fault effects may propagate within the 
control loop after a new steady state is reached.  Therefore, the developed PCA model 
from fault free conditions cannot be used to characterize the new relationship.  This has 
twofold implications.  The first one is that the linear redundant relationships between the 
variables have changed.  The second one is that the system status has changed.  The 
former can be represented by the residual change in the residual space and the latter can 
be represented by the score change in the model space.  
Combining the system status change and the model structure change, a fault 
vector can be characterized by the superposition of two fault vectors defined in the model 
space and in the residual space as follows: 
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 vfuff ˆˆ 21 +=  (4.12) 
where  
uf ˆ1 =  the fault vector defined in the principal component space.  
vf ˆ2 =  the fault vector defined in the residual space. 
The developed PCA model for fault free conditions can be used to decompose a 
measurement vector x  into two spaces, one component ux ˆ1  in the model space and the 
other one vx ˆ2  in the residual space, that is: 
 vxuxx ˆˆ 21 +=  (4.13) 
 












=  (4.14) 
where 
 
postpost xPPIx )'(2 −=  
initialinitial xPPIx )'(2 −=  
P =the loading matrix of the developed PCA model for fault free conditions. 
postx =the measurement obtained after a new steady state has reached since a fault.  
initialx =the measurement before a fault. 
Since 02 ≈









xv =  (4.15) 
 The direction defined in the residual space characterizes the change of the model 
structure after a fault.  However, the fault direction defined in the residual space may not 
be sufficient for fault isolation.  The system status change before and after a fault also 
provides significant information to characterize a fault.  The direction starting from the 
initial plant condition before a fault and pointing to the condition after a fault in the 












=  (4.16) 
where 
postpost xPPx '1 =  
initialinitial xPPx '1 =  
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After the fault signatures have been defined by fault directions, fault isolation can 
be achieved based on the angle of the fault vector both in the model space and in the 
residual space between a detected fault and some reference faults.  A fault is isolated as 
one defined in a reference fault dictionary whose fault direction is most collinear with 
that of the detected fault both in the model space and in the residual space.  
 
4.6 Determination of the Number of Constraints 
 
Since PCA is in full agreement of parity space approach when used for fault 
detection and isolation, it is crucial for a successful FDI system to find out all the 
constraints inherent in the process system.  In the context of PCA based FDI, the 
constraint equations are implicitly represented by the eigenvectors spanning the residual 
space.  Therefore, the correct choice of the number of principal components is important 
for PCA based FDI.  
The most commonly used criteria are cumulative percent variance, Scree plot, 
average Eigenvalue, and cross validation (Wold, 1978).  Cumulative percent variance 
method selects the number of principal components by setting a subjective threshold of 
cumulative percent variance so that the model fitness and the parsimony in using 
principal components are balanced.  Scree plot method is based on the plot of the fraction 
of variance explained by each principal component.  The plot orders the principal 
components from the one that gives the largest amount of explanation to the one that 
gives the least amount of explanation.  This method considers the beginning point of the 
Scree as the most reasonable number of principal components.  Average eigenvalue 
method assumes that all the components whose corresponding eigenvalues are less than 
the average value should be discarded. In addition, cross validation can also be used. 
 
4.7 Recommended PCA Based FDI Procedure 
 
The procedure to implement a PCA based FDI is proposed as follows: 
(1) Become familiar with the system. 
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(2) Get information on the operation history of the system and collect the operation 
experiences of similar plants. 
(3) Select faults of interest from an engineering point of view. The reliability data of the 
components, the environment of the components, the consequences of the component 
failure etc., should be taken into account.  
As far as dual faults are concerned, the selection is mainly safety oriented.  
(4) Study the fault responses of the selected faults.  
(5) Collect data and evaluate its quality for fault free conditions. 
(6) Build a PCA model that is able to characterize the relationships among the measured 
variables. 
(7) Quantitatively define the fault directions for all the faults and save them in a fault 
dictionary.  In effect, only one experiment or one simulation is needed in order to 
determine the fault direction for each fault.  
(8) Implement PCA fault detection using both Q statistic and 2T  statistic. 
(9) Implement PCA fault isolation based on fault directions defined both in the model 
space and in the residual space. 
 
4.8 Application to Nuclear Plant SG System 
 
The PCA based FDI algorithm has been implemented for a PWR steam generator 
system. 
 
4.8.1 Development of PCA model  
 
A good model to characterize the relationships between the measured variables 
plays an essential role in PCA based FDI algorithm. 
 
 52
Table 4.1 lists the fifteen measured variables used to develop the PCA model for 
the SG system.  Before the simulated data are used to build a model, some Gaussian noise 
is added to the data based on the measurement errors of the corresponding sensors. 
Figure 4.1 shows the fractions of the variance contained in the data explained by 
the 15 eigenvectors.  If a threshold of 98% percent is chosen, the number of principal 
components is then determined to be eight.  It should be noted that too few principal 
components will decrease the accuracy of model prediction and too many principal 
components will increase the complexity of the model.  A complicated model is able to 
reduce the training error, but it will lose the capability of generalization because some of 
the degrees of freedoms are only used for modeling the noise. 
Figure 4.2 shows the predicted SG narrow range level and the actual values.  It 
can be seen that the model can predict the trend of the actual data.  The choice of more 
principal components may increase the accuracy of predicting the training data, but it 
may result in over-fitting. 
The eight eigenvectors to define the model space are as follows: 
   -0.2706   -0.0013   -0.0970   -0.0946   -0.0818   -0.2759    0.1669    0.3104 
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   -0.2706   -0.0006   -0.0990   -0.0795   -0.0403   -0.2202   -0.5298   -0.2459 
   -0.2706   -0.0014   -0.0968   -0.0956   -0.0829   -0.2842    0.1756    0.3432 
   -0.2706   -0.0014   -0.0968   -0.0956   -0.0829   -0.2848    0.1756    0.3427 
   -0.2709    0.0074   -0.0580    0.0030   -0.1171    0.1380    0.2736   -0.3691 
    0.2497   -0.0441   -0.6198    0.1270    0.0154   -0.1386    0.0584   -0.1204 
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1 Thermal power 
2 Cold leg 1 temperature 
3 Hot leg 1 temperature 
4 SG1 pressure 
5 Feed water temperature 
6 SG1 steam flow rate 
7 Feed water flow rate to SG1  
8 FCV1 position 
9 FCV1 controller output 
10 SG1 WR indicated level 
11 SG 1 NR indicated level 
12 SG WR reference 
13 SG NR reference 
14 TCV1 flow rate 











































Figure 4.2.  Comparison between the predicted SG NR level and the actual values. 
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The seven eigenvectors to define the residual space are as follows: 
    0.0142    0.1209    0.0868   -0.5418    0.0572    0.6171   -0.0379 
    0.0165   -0.0024    0.0097   -0.0023   -0.0003    0.0020   -0.0004 
   -0.0437   -0.9318    0.0606    0.0029   -0.0031   -0.0036   -0.0002 
   -0.7060    0.0635   -0.0159    0.0004    0.0008    0.0001   -0.0002 
    0.0059    0.0185   -0.0457   -0.0030    0.0006    0.0031   -0.0001 
   -0.0116    0.1161    0.0205    0.0127   -0.3934    0.0088   -0.7140 
   -0.0099    0.1070   -0.0597   -0.0433   -0.4195    0.0017    0.6925 
   -0.0001    0.0011   -0.0002   -0.0000   -0.0004    0.0000    0.0006 
    0.0196   -0.0074   -0.0060   -0.0004    0.0001    0.0006    0.0000 
   -0.0077    0.1015   -0.7152   -0.0456    0.0102    0.0513   -0.0007 
   -0.0051    0.1931    0.6822    0.0506   -0.0591   -0.0618    0.0824 
    0.0165    0.1168   -0.0467    0.7910   -0.0176    0.1729    0.0018 
    0.0160    0.1173   -0.0453   -0.2680    0.0117   -0.7629   -0.0445 
   -0.0112    0.1127    0.0315    0.0470    0.8136   -0.0286    0.0212 
    0.7056    0.0058   -0.0143   -0.0006   -0.0002    0.0004    0.0004 
From the eigenvectors in the residual space, the following approximate linear 
relationships among the measured variables can be derived: 
-0.7140*steam flow rate+0.6925*feed water flow rate=0 
 
0.6171*power+0.1729*WR reference level -0.7629*NR reference level=0 
 
-0.3934*steam flow rate-0.4195*feed water flow rate+0.836*TCV flow rate=0.0 
 
-0.5418*power+0.7910*WR reference level-0.2680*NR reference  
level+0.047*TCV flow rate=0.0 
 
0.0868*power+0.0606*hot leg temperature-0.0597*Steam flow rate-0.7152*WR 
 level+0.6822*NR level=0.0 
 
0.1209*power-0.9318*hot leg temperature-0.0635*SG pressure+0.1161*Steam 
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flow rate+0.1070*Feed water flow rate+0.1015*WR level+0.1931*NR 
level+0.1168*WR reference level+0.1173*NR reference level+0.1127*TCV 
flow=0.0 
-0.7060*SG pressure + 0.7065*SG temperature=0.0 
These equations can be used to reveal the linear relationship among variables. The 
corresponding physical relations can be written as follows: 
Steam flow rate = feed water flow rate 
 
SG wide range reference level =f(SG narrow range reference level, power) 
 
Steam flow rate + feed water flow rate = TCV flow rate 
 
 SG reference level = f (power, TCV flow rate) 
 
SG narrow range level =f(SG wide range level, power, hot leg temperature, feed 
water flow rate) 
 
Hot leg temperature  = f (power, SG pressure, SG NR level, SG flow rate) 
 
SG temperature =f (SG pressure) 
 
As can be seen, all the above equations have clear physical meanings.  However, 
PCA model cannot capture the nonlinear relationship among variables.  For example, the 
PCA model cannot reveal the relationship between FCV valve position and FCV flow 
rate.  Another point that should be emphasized in using PCA for FDI is that the 
measurements must be carefully selected before a PCA model is to be built.  If the 
available measurements do not allow finding out some relations among variables that are 
the basis to isolate some faults, these faults will hence not be isolated. 
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4.8.2 Fault detection  
 
Fault detection can be performed based on the developed PCA models. 
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 shows the T Square and Q statistics for the fault free 
data, respectively.  The red lines in the two figures are the T square or the Q statistical 
limits corresponding to 99% confidence level.  If the corresponding statistics exceeds the 
limit, the confidence to state that the fault free model cannot explain the data is at a level 
greater than 99 %.  The two figures illustrate that all the fault free data are well below the 
limit lines.  The probability of false alarms due to process disturbance is low. 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 show the T square and Q statistics based fault detection 
for feed water flow meter and steam flow meter drift faults.  If the confidence level is 
chosen to be 99%, the false alarm rate and missing detection rate is shown as follow: 
Detecting Fault: Normal Operation 
 PCA detection 
 False alarm rates by T2+Q testing  = 0.04 
 False alarm rate by T2 testing  = 0.03 
 False alarm rate by Q testing  = 0.01 
Detecting Fault: Feed Water Flow Meter Drift Fault 
 PCA detection 
 missing detection rate by T2+Q testing  = 0.000000 
 missing detection rate by T2 testing  = 0.012547 
 missing detection rate by Q testing  = 0.095358 
Detecting Fault: Steam Flow Meter Drift fault 
 PCA detection 
 missing detection rate by T2+Q testing  = 0.000000 
missing detection rate by Q testing  = 0.077792 
missing detection rate by T2 testing  = 0.011292 
 missing detection rate by Q testing  = 0.100376 
Detecting Fault: Steam Flow Meter Feed Flow Meter Drift Faults 
PCA detection 
 missing detection rate by T2+Q testing  = 0.000000 
 missing detection rate by T2 testing  = 0.010038 
 missing detection rate by Q testing  = 0.115433 
Detecting Fault: Feed Flow Meter Drift Fault and SG Level Sensor Drift Fault 
 PCA detection 
 missing detection rate by T2+Q testing  = 0.000000 
 missing detection rate by T2 testing  = 0.013802 
































Figure 4.4.  Q statistics for the normal data. 
 
 

















T square statistics for Normal Operation 
 


























































Figure 4.6.  Q statistics for steam flow meter drift fault and steam flow meter drift fault. 
 


















T square statistics for steam flow and feed flow meter faults 
 
 













Sample Q statistics for steam flow and feed flow meter faults 
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 PCA detection 
 missing detection rate by T2+Q testing  = 0.000000 
missing detection rate by T2 testing  = 0.006274 
 missing detection rate by Q testing  = 0.042660 
Detecting Fault: SG Pressure Sensor Drift Fault 
PCA detection 
 missing detection rate by T2+Q testing  = 0.000000 
 missing detection rate by T2 testing  = 0.002789 
 missing detection rate by Q testing  = 0.068042 
Detecting Fault: Feed Water Flow Meter Drift fault & SG Pressure Sensor Drift Fault 
 PCA detection 
 missing detection rate by T2+Q testing  = 0.000000 
 missing detection rate by T2 testing  = 0.001255 
 missing detection rate by Q testing  = 0.097867 
Detecting Fault: SG Level Sensor Drift Fault & SG Pressure Sensor Drift Fault 
 PCA detection 
missing detection rate by T2+Q testing  = 0.000000 
missing detection rate by T2 testing  = 0.006274 
missing detection rate by Q testing  = 0.096612 
Detecting Fault: SG Level Sensor Drift Fault 
It can be seen that the missing detection rate is small for all the selected faults.  It 
should be kept in mind that both 2T  and Q statistics must be used for fault detection. 
Either statistics being violated will signify that a fault has happened.  The violation of 2T  
statistics represents that the system operates at an abnormal state beyond the model space. 
The violation of Q statistics represents that some of the constraint equations defined in 
the residual space are violated and the system is abnormal. 
PCA can only deal with steady state condition or a slow dynamic process.  The 
algorithm to perform PCA based fault detection is only applicable to steady state 
condition.  When the false alarm rate and the missing detection rate are carefully 
examined, the false alarm rate and the missing detection rates are not equal to the 
expected value of one percent.  The reason is that the probabilistic distribution underlying 
the data used to build the model is not normal.  Therefore, it is reasonable that the false 
alarm rate and the missing detection rate are not equal to the specified significance level. 
The significance level should be determined using experiences obtained from testing the 
FDI design on the process system. 
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It should also be noticed that the confidence level would affect the false alarm rate 
and the missing detection rate.  A higher confidence level tends to result in a smaller false 
alarm rate but a higher missing detection rate. In a real application, the confidence level 
needs to be adjusted according to the operation requirements. 
 
4.8.3 Fault identification 
 
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 show the contribution plots of the abnormal scores and 
the abnormal residuals for the feed water flow meter drift fault, respectively.  The 
contribution plots show that the most affected variables for the feed water flow meter 
drift fault as follows: 
• Reactor power 
• Feed water temperature 
• Feed water flow rate 
• Steam flow rate 
• SG NR level 
• SG temperature 
All the identified variables are in agreement with the analysis of the fault 
responses.  The feed water flow rate has been successfully identified as important 
variables of concern. 
The fault identification does not give immediate results to isolate faults.  It only 
provides information about what variables significantly contribute to the residuals.  This 
is true especially in the case that a feed back controller is involved since all the 
measurements within the control loop may be affected by a fault in the closed loop. 
 
4.8.4 Fault isolation 
 
The objective of fault isolation is to determine whether the fault is known in the 
fault dictionary and to determine which fault is the most likely one after the fault has 





































Figure 4.8.  Contribution plot in the residual space for feed water flow meter fault. 
 
 



























































The fault direction jointly defined in the model space and in the residual space has 
been used as fault signature for fault isolation.  The fault direction is represented by the 
cosine angle of the fault directions between the unknown fault and all the 13 reference 
faults.  These reference faults are numbered as follows: 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault. 
• Steam flow meter offset fault. 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault and steam flow meter offset fault. 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault and SG level sensor offset fault. 
• Steam flow meter offset fault and SG level sensor offset fault. 
• SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault and SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
• Feed water flow meter offset fault and FCV offset sensor offset fault. 
• Steam flow meter offset fault and FCV position offset fault. 
• FCV valve position offset fault. 
• SG pressure sensor offset fault and SG level sensor offset fault. 
• SG level sensor offset fault. 
• Steam flow meter offset fault and SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
Figure 4.9 shows the fault direction in the model space and in the residual space 
for SG NR level sensor fault and feed water flow meter sensor fault without using SG 
wide range level.  The feed water flow meter fault cannot be distinguished from feed 
water flow meter sensor fault plus SG level sensor fault.  This is because the symptoms 
of the former fault envelope all those of the latter fault.  Therefore, no additional 
information can be used to uniquely isolate SG NR level sensor fault. 
Figure 4.10 shows the fault direction for the feed flow meter fault after the SG 
wide range level sensor has been used.  After SG wide range level signal is used, feed 
water flow meter fault can then be isolated from feed water flow meter sensor fault plus 
























Figure 4.9.  Fault direction for feed water flow meter offset fault and SG NR level sensor 






















Figure 4.10.  Fault direction for feed water flow meter offset fault. 
 


















































including dual faults, measurement redundancy must be used to avoid the compensation 
effect of controller feedback.  
Furthermore, an important criterion to judge if the designed FDI scheme is 
successful or not is to test the stability of the fault signatures in different fault magnitudes 
and under different initial operation conditions.  For this reason, a set of data in fault 
magnitude of three percent under the initial power level at 80% full power, which are 
unknown to the fault dictionary, are generated to test the reliability of the designed FDI 
system.  
Figure 4.11 to Figure 4.22 show the fault direction both in the model space and in 
the residual space for the defined 13 faults respectively in magnitude of three percent 
under the initial power level at 80% full power.  As can be seen, the fault direction in 
either model space or residual space is sometimes not enough to isolate dual faults.  For 
example, the fault direction in the model space for steam flow meter offset fault is similar 
to that for steam flow meter offset fault plus SG NR level sensor fault (See Figure 4.11). 
Nonetheless, the fault direction in the residual space for steam flow meter offset fault is 
quite different from steam flow meter offset fault plus SG NR level sensor fault.  An 
opposite example is that the fault direction in the model space helps to isolate a fault.  
The fault direction in the residual space for steam flow meter offset is similar to that for 
steam flow meter offset fault plus FCV position fault (See also Figure 4.11). 
Nevertheless, the fault direction in the model space for steam flow meter offset 
fault is quite different from steam flow meter offset fault plus FCV valve position offset 
fault. Therefore, when the joint fault direction is used, there is more possibility to isolate 
faults.  
The cosine of the angle between the fault direction of an unknown fault and those 
of the reference faults can also be used as confidence level when a decision is to be made. 
Figure 4.15 shows that no significant margin exists to isolate a SG pressure sensor fault 
from a SG pressure sensor fault plus a steam flow meter offset fault.  Figure 4.19 shows 










































Figure 4.12.  Fault direction for feed water flow meter offset fault and steam flow meter 
offset fault. 
 












































































Figure 4.13.  Fault direction for feed water flow meter offset fault and SG NR level 




















Figure 4.14.  Fault direction for steam flow meter offset fault and SG NR level sensor 
offset fault. 
 




















































































































Figure 4.16.  Fault direction for feed water flow meter offset fault and SG pressure sensor 
offset fault. 
 



































































































Figure 4.18.  Fault direction for steam flow meter offset fault and FCV position offset 
fault. 
 








































































































Figure 4.20.  Fault direction for SG level sensor offset fault and SG pressure sensor offset 
fault. 
 


































































































Figure 4.22.  Fault direction for steam flow meter offset fault and SG pressure sensor 
offset fault. 
 



























































offset fault plus FCV position fault.  Therefore, when decisions are made, the confidence 




This chapter has presented the PCA approach to fault detection and isolation and 
its application to PWR steam generator system.  The PCA approach is shown to be in 
agreement with parity space approach.  The linear relationship among measured variables 
implying analytical redundancy can be consistently represented by the eigenvectors 
corresponding to the trivial components.  The fault directions jointly defined both in the 
model space and in the residual space is a sensitive fault signature for fault isolation. 
PCA approach needs the least information about a system when applied to FDI.  It 
is simple to achieve on-line implementation.  It provides an ideal tool to supervise plant 
status without too much investment.  However, PCA approach has many inherent 
weaknesses.  From the viewpoint of modeling, linear PCA is only applicable to a linear 
static system.  It is difficult to develop a nonlinear PCA model for a dynamic system 
accurate enough to reveal the analytical redundancy inherent in a physical system.  With 
regard to fault isolation, the fault characteristics must be defined from fault data for the 
enumerated faults.  This exerts heavy burden on engineering application.  In addition, the 
fault isolation is a process of classification, so the decision has poor interpretability. 
Because PCA approach has inherent connection with parity space approach, it is 
very important to validate the constraint equations extracted from PCA modeling.  If 
process variables are not appropriately chosen, some constraint equations necessary for 
fault isolation may not be obtained.  If the number of principal components is chosen 
incorrectly, the residual direction cannot be used to characterize a fault. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Adaptive Network Fuzzy Inference System 
for Fault Diagnosis 
 
 
A PCA model cannot take advantage of the available system knowledge.  For this 
reason, sometimes it is very difficult to build an appropriate model with low model 
uncertainty. Some of these difficulties are as follow: 
• When a large number of variables are involved, it is hard to make sure that all the 
measurements are well excited in order to obtain a model with reliable generalization 
capability. 
• When noisy data is involved, its effects on how the constraint equations are extracted 
from the noisy data are unknown to the analyst.  
• When nonlinear behavior is involved, it is hard to have a tradeoff between choosing 
more principal components to have a better approximation and preclude the 
disturbance of noises. 
In order to overcome these problems and keep the good feature of historical data 
based FDI approach, ANFIS is implemented to generate models for FDI.  This method 
can take advantage of the available system knowledge and captures the most relevant 
relationships among measured variables to characterize a fault. 
 
5.1 ANFIS Architecture 
 
ANFIS is a fuzzy inference system implemented in the framework of artificial 
neural network (Jang, 1990).  It is able to combine the reasoning capability of fuzzy logic 
and the learning capability of neural network. It is efficient in building a model with only 
a few inputs and one output.  A fuzzy inference system implements inference procedure 
using fuzzy rules.  A fuzzy rule can be expressed linguistically as follows: 
 If x is A then y is B (5.1) 
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A fuzzy rule is analytically an implication relation R between its antecedent x and 
its consequent y, which can be expressed as: 
 ∫= ),( ),/(),(),( yx yxyxyxR µ  (5.2) 
where 
),( yxµ = membership function. 
The implication relationship R(x,y) can also be explained as the membership 
function of a fuzzy set defined in a two dimensional universe of discourse (x,y). It can be 
computed using implication operator φ as follows:  
 ))(),((),( yxyxR BA µµφ=  (5.3) 
The most commonly used implication operators are Larsen product and Madamni min. 
If there are several input variables, it is necessary to have several antecedents 
connected with fuzzy operators.  In general, a fuzzy inference system uses a set of fuzzy 
rules connected with connectives forming fuzzy algorithms.  
Fuzzy inference of Generalized Modus Ponens is stated as the following problem: 
    If x is A then y is B 
 '' ByAx =⇒=  (5.4) 
In the above problem statement, the known part is R(x,y) and A', the unknown 
part is B' associated with A'. This inference procedure is a fuzzy composition given by: 
 ),('' yxRAB =  (5.5) 
The most commonly used fuzzy composition operators are Max-Min if Madamni 
Min implication relationship is used and Max-Product if Larsen Product implication 
relationship is used. 
A fuzzy inference system has the following four components (Jang, 1994): 
• A rule base containing if-then rules. 
• A database defining the membership functions used by the fuzzy rules. 
• A decision-making unit performing inference operations on the rules. 
• A unit to fuzzify the inputs and a unit to defuzzify the fuzzy outputs. 
Five steps need to be taken in a fuzzy inference system as follows:  
• Fuzzify the inputs. 
• Apply fuzzy operator. 
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• Apply implication Method. 
• Aggregate all the outputs. 
• Defuzzify the output. 
The first step is to fuzzify the crisp inputs. In this step, the membership values of 
each input variable are computed.  The second step is to apply fuzzy operators to 
compute the degree of the fulfillment (DOF) of the whole antecedent for each fuzzy rule 
by combining the membership values of all the fuzzy inputs.  The result is the firing 
strength of its corresponding rule.  In the third step, the membership of the consequent for 
each rule is computed based on the DOF of the antecedent for the corresponding rule by 
applying appropriate composition method.  The fourth step is to aggregate the 
membership of the fuzzy outputs for all the rules.  The final step is to defuzzify the output 
using methods such as centroid, maximum criterion, etc.  
The simplest fuzzy inference model is of Sugeno type.  It has the following form 
of fuzzy rules: 
    If x is A and y is B then  
 z=f(x) (5.6) 
where A and B are fuzzy sets and z=f(x) is a crisp function.  
In this model, the consequent of each fuzzy rule is simply a crisp function rather 
than a fuzzy set. It can significantly simplify fuzzy reasoning.  In general, aggregation 
and defuzzification will involve matrix operation in high dimensional space.  However, 
for a Sugeno fuzzy model, only a simple arithmetic function is involved in computing the 
output of each rule.  Hence, the aggregation and defuzzification can be combined into a 
weighted sum (Hines and Wrest, 1997).  
A Sugeno fuzzy model evolves into its first order form if the defined function is 
of first order.  Given that there are two inputs and one output, two of the fuzzy rules can 
be represented by: 
Rule 1: If x is A1 and y is B1 then z=ax+by+c 
Rule 2: If x is A2 and y is B2 then z=px+qy+r 
The output f can then be obtained as the sum of the two crisp output f1 and f2 
weighted by the firing strength ratio w1 and w2. That is 
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 2211 fwfwf +=  (5.7) 
When the fuzzy inference system is implemented using an adaptive network, the 
network system consists of layers of nodes capable of adapting parameters to map the 
desired input-output relation using fuzzy inference mechanism.  For each node, there are 
several inputs and one output.  The processing inside each node is nothing but performing 
some function computation.  There are no weights designated to the connection between 
two nodes, but there is directional indication.  
A classical ANFIS architecture, developed by Jang, 1994, is shown in Figure 5.1.  
Two fuzzy rules are involved in the four layers of network.  The nodes in the first layer 
take crisp inputs and compute the DOF of the fuzzy sets (A1, A2, B1, B2).  These fuzzy 
sets are parameterized fuzzy sets.  Their membership functions can be adjusted easily by 
changing a set of parameters.  The two nodes in the second layer correspond to the two 
fuzzy rules.  All the nodes in this layer take two inputs to give an output, w1 or w2, 
representing the firing strength of each rule based on the product of the two membership 
values being involved.  The third layer is responsible for calculating the relative 
importance of each rule ( 1w and 2w ), the ratio of one rule's strength to the sum of the 
firing strengths of all the rules.  Each node in the fourth layer contains a node function to 
calculate the consequent multiplied by the ratio calculated in the third layer.  The output 
layer gives the final output by summing all its inputs. 
 
5.2 ANFIS Learning Rule  
 
 Hybrid learning algorithm is developed for training ANFIS, which combines the 
gradient descent method and the least square method (Jang, 1994).  The training process 
involves tuning parameters such that the desired input-output mapping is achieved.  The 
tuned parameters are classified into two sets.  One set describes the linear relationship 
between the inputs and the outputs, which contains the parameters of the crisp function to 
describe the consequent of each rule. The other set of parameters describes the non-
linearity between the inputs and the outputs, which involves those parameters defining 










































 In the forward pass, the parameters describing the linear relationships are 
upgraded by sequential least square training.  After the error is computed, the gradient 
descent training is used, which makes the error propagated from the output layer to the 
input layer.  In this backward pass, the parameters describing the nonlinear relationship 
are upgraded.  The training process does not end until the desired error goal is reached or 
the designated maximum number of epochs is exceeded. 
For the ANFIS structure with two inputs and one output, the system output can be 
expressed as follows: 
)()2,2()()1,1( 22221111 ryqxpBAwryqxpBAwf ++∗+++∗=  
The parameter space S  is partitioned into two subspaces 1S  and 2S given by: 
21 SSS +=  
where 
)2,2,1,1(1 BABAS ⊃  
),,,,,( 2221112 rqprqpS ⊃  
During the forward pass with the fixed set 1S , the parameters in the subspace 




X = input data set. 
Y = target output. 
During the backward pass with the fixed set 2S , the parameters in the subspace 









5 ryqxpwryqxpwO +++++∗=   
=T target output. 
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5 OOO +=  =the system output.  
k
iO =the output of the ith node for the kth layer. 






































































































































































































































































































































































The derivative of the output error with respect to the parameters used to define the 























jS ,1 =the jth parameter in the space of 1S . 
M =the number of fuzzy sets used to define the fuzzy rules.  
 If Gaussian membership function is used for the jth fuzzy set in the first layer, 
























































−=∆ η  
where η  is the learning rate.  
 The hybrid learning algorithm is much faster than gradient descent method only 
or gradient descent and one pass of least squares method (Jang, 1993).  If some 
membership functions or some rule functions are determined from expert knowledge, the 
learning algorithms can be easily adapted to develop some hybrid models.  
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5.3 Structured Residual Design Approach  
 
 If structured residual design approach is used for fault isolation, the residual 
vector is represented by the bit numbers for a set of models.  The bit number 1 indicates 
that the model has a significant residual while the bit number 0 indicates the model has 
insignificant residual.  If there are only single faults in the designed FDI system, it is 
possible to achieve strong fault isolation if the model structures are carefully chosen.  The 
most straightforward method to obtain residuals is based on the natural redundancy in a 
process.  Table 5.1 shows the residual structure of four models for four faults.  The 
residual pattern for fault 1 is [1,1,0,0]; the residual pattern for fault 2 is [1,0,0,0]; the 
residual pattern for fault 3 is [0,0,1,1]; and the residual pattern for fault 4 is [0,0,1,0].  If 
the bit number of model 3 for fault 2 degenerate, fault 2 will be misdiagnosed as fault 1.  
If the bit number of model 4 for fault 3 degenerate, fault 4 will be misdiagnosed as fault 
1.  This kind of residual structure can only result in weak isolation between faults.  In 
order to achieve strong fault isolation, which means a fault will not be misdiagnosed as 
another fault even if one bit number has degenerated, it is necessary to transform the 
residual vectors into a structured form shown in Table 5.2.  For a linear system, the 
structured residual can be achieved by a linear transformation on the original residuals.  
However, for a nonlinear system, it is quite difficult to derive new dependent equations 
by algebraic combinations of the previous equations in order to obtain the desired 
residual structure (Garcia, et al, 2000). 
 
5.4 Application to Nuclear Plant SG System  
 
Once the possible faults are enumerated based on engineering judgments 
structured residual design approach with ANFIS models can be implemented for fault 
diagnosis for nuclear SG system.  The study shows different residual structures are 





Table 5.1.  Structured residual design for weak fault isolation 
Model Fault 1 Fault 2 Fault 3 Fault 4 
Model 1 1 1 0 0 
Model 2 1 0 0 0 
Model 3 0 0 1 1 






 Table 5.2.  Structured residual design for strong fault isolation   
Model Fault 1 Fault 2 Fault 3 Fault 4 
Model 1 1 1 0 1 
Model 2 1 0 0 0 
Model 3 0 0 1 1 








For PWR SG system, the model structures derived from the physical analysis are 
as follows: 
 
FCV flow rate (t)=f (FCV valve position (t), SG pressure (t)) 
 
FCV valve position (t+1)=f (controller output (t), FCV valve position (t)) 
 
SG pressure (t)=f(SG temperature(t)) 
 
Steam flow rate(t+1)=f(feed water temperature(t), SG pressure(t), hot leg temperature(t), 
cold leg temperature(t)) 
 
SG level (t+1)=f(SG level(t),Feed water flow rate(t), steam flow rate(t),SG pressure(t))  
Table 5.3 shows the residual patterns for the 13 faults with the above model 
structure.  In the table, the bit number 0 indicates that the model to predict the specific 
variable will not generate significant residual while the bit number 1 indicates that the 
residual is significant.  The threshold to distinguish the significance is determined by the 
model accuracy and the level of plant disturbance.  As can be seen from the table, the 
residual patterns can be directly used to achieve strong fault isolation for the three single 
faults (feed water flow meter offset, steam flow meter offset and FCV position offset). 
However, the SG level sensor fault cannot even be detected. In this case, the residuals 
refer to the values after the new steady state has been reached.  Due to the compensation 
effects of the SG level controller, the relationship among the feed water flow rate, the 
steam flow rate, the SG pressure, the FCV position and the SG level are always attempted 
not to change.  Therefore, it is usually very difficult to detect a minor fault of the steam 
generator water level sensor fault based on a steady state model.  The table also shows 
that some residuals become unstable due to fault competition with different fault 
magnitudes when dual faults are involved.  The unstable residuals of the SG level model, 
denoted by the sign "?" in the table, correspond to the following combination of faults: 
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Table 5.3.  Consistency checking using natural redundant relations 








SG pressure FCV valve 
position 
SG level 
Feed flow meter offset 1 0 0 0 1 
Steam flow meter 
offset 
0 1 0 0 1 
Steam flow meter and 
feed flow meter offset 
1 0 0 0 ? 
SG NR level sensor 
offset 
0 0 0 0 0 
Feed flow meter offset 
and SG level 
sensor offset 
1 1 0 0 1 
Steam flow meter 
offset and SG level 
sensor offset 
0 1 0 0 1 
SG pressure 
sensor offset 
1 1 1 0 1 
Feed flow meter offset 
and SG pressure sensor 
offset 
1 1 1 0 1 
Steam flow meter 
offset and SG pressure 
sensor offset 
1 1 1 0 1 
SG level sensor offset 
and SG pressure 
sensor offset 
1 1 1 0 ? 
Feed water flow meter 
offset and FCV 
position offset 
 
1 0 0 1 ? 
Steam flow meter 
offset and FCV 
position offset 
0 1 0 1 1 
FCV position offset 0 0 0 1 1 
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• Steam flow meter offset plus feed flow meter offset. 
• SG pressure sensor offset plus SG level sensor offset. 
• FCV valve position offset plus feed water flow meter offset. 
Although the residual structure can be used directly to isolate the three single 
faults, it is not sufficient to isolate dual faults. These dual faults are:  
• Feed flow meter offset plus SG level sensor offset cannot be separated from feed flow 
meter offset.  
• Steam flow meter offset plus SG level sensor offset cannot be separated from steam 
flow meter offset.  
• SG pressure sensor fault plus Feed flow meter offset cannot be separated from steam 
SG pressure sensor fault. 
• SG pressure sensor fault plus SG level sensor offset and SG pressure sensor fault plus 
SG steam flow meter offset. 
In conclusion, although a set of models derived from physical analysis may result 
in different residual patterns for fault isolation, they are usually not effective to deal with 
dual faults.  When used for dual fault isolation, some dual faults may result in the same 
residual pattern as their element faults.  In addition, the residuals of some models may 
become unstable for dual faults with different fault magnitudes. 
 
5.4.1 Dedicated residual design for dual faults  
 
Because dual faults usually cannot be strongly isolated from its element faults, 
dedicated residual structure is designed to isolate dual faults.  Dedicated residual 
structure has the following two properties: 
• Each residual is only sensitive to one fault and insensitive to all the other faults. 
• Different faults result in different types of residual patterns.  
If the possible faults are known, dedicated residual structure can be obtained 
through appropriately selecting the model structures to generate residuals.  The 
alternative models can be derived based on: 
• Natural redundancy 
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For instance, for a saturated system, the temperature and the pressure has one to 
one correspondence.  Any model involving either variable can be substituted by the other 
variable. 
• Derived redundancy 
For instance, if the flow rate is determined by the system pressure and the valve 
position for a system, any model involving the flow rate can be substituted by the system 
pressure and the valve position. 
• Measurement redundancy 
The measurement redundancy is the most primitive one.  For the SG system, the 
SG narrow range level measurement involved in any model can be substituted by the SG 
wide range level measurements. 
In order to isolate the specified 13 faults for the nuclear SG system, the models 
with dedicated residual structure are defined as follow: 
 
FCV flow rate (t)=f (FCV valve position (t), SG temperature (t)) 
 
FCV valve position (t+1)=f (controller output (t), FCV valve position (t)) 
 
SG pressure (t)=f(SG temperature(t)) 
 
Steam flow rate(t+1)=f(feed water temperature(t), SG temperature(t), hot leg 
temperature(t), cold leg temperature(t)) 
 
SG NR level (t)=f(SG WR level(t),Feed water temperature(t)) 
 
In order to isolate dual faults involving the controlled variable from their element 
faults in a closed control loop, the measurement redundancy has to be used.  For the 
nuclear SG level system, SG WR level sensor has to be used to isolate SG NR level 
sensor fault from SG NR level sensor fault plus another fault in the control loop. 
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5.4.2 ANFIS modeling for SG system 
 
The ANFIS modeling has been used to construct the five models for the system 
during normal operation.  Before the ANFIS models are constructed, the input variables 
need to be appropriately scaled.  The purpose to scale the inputs is to give equal 
importance to all the inputs in the case that the input variables are in different units.  
Feed water flow rate model is shown as an example to train the ANFIS model.  
The network uses two bell-shape membership functions for either input.  Two rules have 
been selected to map the input and output relationship.  
Figure 5.2 shows the membership functions for the ANFIS model to predict the 
FCV valve flow rate before and after training.  It can be seen that the training has 
changed the shape of the membership function for the first input (FCV valve position) 
significantly.  In general, this change reflects the degree of nonlinearly contained in the 
mapping between the input and the output.  After three epochs, the ANFIS model has 
been trained to reach a training error less than 0.5 %.  
 
5.4.3 Model testing and validation 
 
The residuals generated by some models can be immediately used for fault 
detection. If the sum square residuals of all the models are greater than a specified 
threshold, a fault is assumed to have happened. 
In order to reduce the false alarm rates for fault detection, these models must be 
able to correctly characterize the system behavior under all the fault free conditions. 
However, if the models are fully static, any changes in the plant status or even plant 
disturbance will cause false alarms because the dynamic behavior of the system is 
unknown to the system.  For this reason, most FDI systems need to use dynamic models. 
The dynamic models are able to simulate the normal transients such as a normal power 
transient. 
In order to test the performance in characterizing the dynamic behavior, a power 



































































































the last section.  Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.6 show the comparison between the estimation 
from the ANFIS models and the actual values obtained by the SimPWR simulation code 
for the following variables: 
• SG narrow range level. 
• Steam flow rate. 
• FCV flow rate. 
• FCV valve position. 
From these figures, it can be seen that the ANFIS models can correctly simulate 
the transient process with low errors.  When a large complex system with strong 
interaction is involved, it is usually very challenging to build perfect data driven models.  
For instance, it would be difficult to build a data driven model for a fast transient due to 
the fast interaction among systems.  For fast transients, it will involve much more 
complicated model structure and it is harder to collect data to sufficiently excite all the 
related subsystems.  
However, from FDI point of view, the slight errors of these models will not 
impose a serious problem.  First, different thresholds can be set to the residuals for 
different models depending on the accuracy of the models.  Secondly, fast transient is not 
of major interest for an incipient fault detection and isolation system.  A fast power 
transient is usually under cautious supervision of operators, so operators can easily switch 
off the FDI system if the expected transient is any faster than the designed level.  In 
general, the ANFIS models should give correct estimation if the relationship between the 
input variables and the output variable does not change.  However, if a fault happens, 
some input variables may be outside their training range and the model may perform 
unreliable extrapolation.  Hence, the residual of the model may exceed the specified 
threshold. In order to avoid this problem, it is necessary to evaluate whether the models 
are excited in all fault cases. 
 An example is given to show the importance of model testing for SG NR level 







































Figure 5.4.  Transient simulation of steam flow rate using ANFIS model. 
 



































































































Figure 5.6.  Transient simulation of FCV position using ANFIS model. 
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generate unstable residual patterns for different fault magnitudes.  Figure 5.7 shows that 
when the SG steam flow meter and the SG pressure sensor have less than 2% offset 
faults, the residual is less than 0.5%.  However, when the fault magnitude is 3%, the 
residuals become unstable.  To investigate the causes, the training range of the inputs is 
examined.  The minimum values of the feed water temperature and the SG WR SG level 
are 313.94 F and 76.269% respectively.  The maximum values of the feed water 
temperature and the SG WR SG level are 438.4 F and 85.599% respectively.  However, 
for the SG steam flow meter and SG pressure sensor offset faults with 3% fault 
magnitude, the minimum values of the feed water temperature and the SG WR SG level 
are 440.42 F and 83.0% respectively and the maximal values are 440.5 F and 86.167% 
respectively.  Apparently, the fault data have exceeded the training range, so the ANFIS 
model is not able to correctly compute the residual of the SG narrow range level. 
After more data is collected to cover the entire range for the faults, the residuals 
exhibit consistent behavior.  Figure 5.8 shows that the residuals of SG NR level models 
are within 1% for the dual faults (the SG steam flow meter and the SG pressure sensor 
offset fault) when the SG NR level sensors are healthy.  
 
5.4.4 FDI Results   
 
Table 5.4 shows the dedicated residual structure to isolate the defined 13 single 
and dual faults. As can be seen, each ANFIS model is dedicated to isolate one fault. For 
dual faults, the corresponding two models dedicated to the two element faults will 
generate significant residuals, which provides the full possibility to isolate them.  
Figure 5.9 to Figure 5.16 show the residual structures for different fault 
magnitudes. In these figures, the 13 fault classes correspond to the following faults: 
• Fault class 1= Feed water flow meter offset fault. 
• Fault class 2= Steam flow meter offset fault. 
• Fault class 3= Feed water flow meter offset fault and steam flow meter offset fault. 
• Fault class 4= SG level sensor offset fault. 











































Figure 5.8.  Stable residual of SG level for SG pressure and steam flow meter fault. 
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Table 5.4.  Dedicated residual structure for SG system 
 







SG pressure FCV valve 
position 
SG level 
Feed flow meter offset 1 0 0 0 0 
Steam flow meter 
offset 
0 1 0 0 0 
Steam flow meter and 
feed flow meter offset 
1 1 0 0 0 
SG NR level sensor 
offset 
0 0 0 0 1 
Feed flow meter offset 
and SG level 
sensor offset 
1 0 0 0 1 
Steam flow meter 
offset and SG level 
sensor offset 
0 1 0 0 1 
SG pressure 
sensor offset 
0 0 1 0 0 
Feed flow meter offset 
and SG pressure sensor 
offset 
1 0 1 0 0 
Steam flow meter 
offset and SG pressure 
sensor offset 
0 1 1 0 0 
SG level sensor offset 
and SG pressure sensor 
offset 
0 0 1 0 1 
Feed water flow meter 
offset and FCV 
position offset 
 
1 0 0 1 0 
Steam flow meter 
offset and FCV 
position offset 
0 1 0 1 0 
















Figure 5.9.  Structured residual pattern using ANFIS models  














Figure 5.10.  Structured residual pattern using ANFIS models 
(100% Power, 2% offset fault). 
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Figure 5.11.  Structured residual pattern using ANFIS models 













Figure 5.12.  Structured residual pattern using ANFIS models 
(100% Power, -1% offset fault). 
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Figure 5.13.  Structured residual pattern using ANFIS models 














Figure 5.14.  Structured residual pattern using ANFIS models 
(100% Power, -3% offset fault). 
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Figure 5.16.  Structured residual pattern using ANFIS models 
(80% Power, 1% offset fault). 
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• Fault class 6= Steam flow meter offset fault and SG level sensor offset fault. 
• Fault class 7= SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
• Fault class 8= Feed water flow meter offset fault and SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
• Fault class 9= Steam flow meter offset fault and SG pressure sensor offset fault. 
• Fault class 10= SG pressure sensor offset fault and SG level sensor offset fault. 
• Fault class 11= Feed water flow meter offset fault and FCV offset sensor offset fault. 
• Fault class 12= Steam flow meter offset fault and FCV position offset fault. 
• Fault class 13= FCV valve position offset fault. 
In each figure, the 13 faults have different residual patterns, so they can be 
isolated.  If the residual patterns are compared for different fault magnitudes, their 
structures are stable.  Moreover, the residuals are approximately equal to the fault 
magnitudes of the sensor faults such as the feed water flow meter fault and the steam 
flow meter fault.  Theoretically, the residuals should be exactly as same as the fault 
magnitudes.  However, due to the modeling errors of these data driven models, some 
slight differences still exist and these slight differences in FDI are acceptable.  The faults 
occurring at 80% initial power level other than 100% full power are also tested.  Figure 
5.16 clearly shows that the performance of the FDI system does not degrade.  The 




This chapter has presented ANFIS model based approach to fault detection and 
isolation and the application to PWR steam generator system.  ANFIS model based 
approach combined with structured residual design is shown to be efficient in fault 
detection and isolation if the possible faults are enumerable.  For single faults, strong 
isolation scheme can be achieved through appropriate choice of the model structures.  For 
dual faults, it is not possible to achieve strong isolation between the dual faults and one of 
the element faults.  Using natural redundancy and derived redundancy, dedicated residual 
structure can be achieved to isolate dual faults.  In order to detect and isolate a fault 
related to control variable, sometimes it is necessary to use the information about 
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measurement redundancy itself.  ANFIS model based approach combined with structured 
residual design does not need fault signatures dependent of fault magnitude and initial 
operation condition.  It is in conformance with the principle of modern fault detection and 
isolation methods.  Since ANFIS is able to learn the relationship between variables from 
data, it has the power of on-line implementation.   
However, ANFIS model based approach needs to enumerate the possible faults.  
This still exert heavy burden on engineering application.  In addition, for a non-linear 
complicated system, structured residual design for fault isolation, especially when data 
driven modeling is used, is essentially a process of trial and error.  This exerts additional 
difficulties in engineering application. 
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Chapter 6  
 





In Chapter 5, the dedicated residual structure is achieved based on the assumption 
that the possible faults are enumerable.  With the faults known, the designers may 
achieve fault isolation through appropriate choice of the models.  However, for a large 
complex system, it will be extremely challenging to enumerate all the possible faults.  In 
order to avoid enumerating possible faults and predefining their associated fault 
signatures, the development of data driven model causal graph approach has been 
considered. 
Data driven model causal graph is proposed as a generic approach to fault 
diagnosis for fault isolation.  It is able to combine the reasoning capability of qualitative 
knowledge based method and the strength in resolution of quantitative knowledge based 
method.  To facilitate on-line implementation, ANFIS is used for modeling. Fault 
detection is fulfilled by monitoring the residual of each model.  Fault isolation is 
achieved by cause effect analysis of the residuals generated from the models. 
 
6.2 Cause Effect Reasoning Using Model Causal Graph 
 
Cause effect reasoning was originally introduced as a reasoning tool to account 
for the propagation of fault symptoms within a system (Davis, 1983).  It has been 
extended to quantitative model based FDI when mathematical models are available 
(Montain and Gentil, 2000).  
A model causal graph consists of individual nodes connected by quantitative 
models. The individual nodes represent plant parameters, state variables and 
measurement variables.  The quantitative models represent the cause-effect relationship 
between the nodes.  As compared with sign directed graphs using qualitative knowledge 
only to describe the relationship between variables, a quantitative model is formally 
 102
introduced to express the cause effect relationships.  The model causal graph is not a 
simple network of structural models.  It includes the dynamic information about process 
flow-path, signal flow-path, and control logic so that a fault can be localized based on the 
cause effect analysis for a process system. 
A physical system can be represented by the following set of differential 
equations: 
 ),( iiii XGgX =  (6.1) 
where 
iX = the i  th system variables. 
ig = a function to estimate iX . 
}|{ ijXG ji ≠= ,  
iG  = a set of variables as the inputs to ig . 
The moving average form of the above differential equation can be used to arrive 
at the causal graph models, that is: 
 )( iii GfX =  (6.2) 
If the model causal graph is developed based upon the original process flow and 
signal flow, the causal relationship between variables will be implicit in it.  
The cause effect relationship between the inputs and the outputs of a model has 
two connotations (Leyal, Gentil and Stephan, 1994).  From physics point of view, the 
cause-effect relation represents the pathway of the signal propagation.  Any changes in 
the model inputs are always before any changes in the model outputs in the time domain. 
From the computational point of view, the cause-effect relation means that any changes 
in the model inputs will sufficiently cause some changes in the model outputs and the 
model outputs will not change without any changes in the model inputs.  Figure 6.1 
shows a simple example of a model causal graph.  In the figure, four models 
4321 g,g,g,g  are shown to characterize the system.  The six process variables are X1, 












Figure 6.1.  A simple example of model causal graph. 
 
Causal effect reasoning can be easily performed based on analyzing the residuals 
of the individual models.  The original residuals are calculated for each measured 
variable as follows: 
 
*
iii XXR −=  (6.3) 
where 
=iR  the residual of  the variable iX . 
=iX  the measured value of the variable iX . 
=*iX  the estimated value of  the variable iX  from the model if  defined previously. 
If iR  is significant, it can be determined that a fault has occurred to the system. 
However, there are still two possibilities that may explain the abnormal residual: 
a) A local fault affecting iX . 
b) A consequence of a fault affecting the inputs of the model if . 
To facilitate fault isolation, a set of reconstructed residuals are calculated as 
follows: 









 the residual of iX after the input jX of model if has been reconstructed. 
=jiX
~ .the estimated value of iX  after the input jX of model if has been reconstructed 
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X  have simultaneous faults. 
As an example, the above model causal graph method is used for a typical feed 
back control loop as shown in Figure 6.2.  Four nodes connected by three models are 
used to represent the control loop.  These four nodes are the set point, the controller 
output, the control variable, and the regulated variable.  The three models are the 
controller model, the actuator model and the plant model.  Since a controller always takes 
the measured value of the regulated variable as input, the controller model can always be 
used to isolate a controller fault.  For the same reason, the actuator model can be used to 
isolate an actuator fault.  However, fault detection and isolation becomes a challenging 
task when a fault related to the regulated variable is involved.  When a new steady state is 
reached after the fault, the regulated variable will be brought back to its original level.  





































Model causal graph method needs to use dynamic models.  If a steady state model 
is used, the developed method can give correct FDI results after a new steady state has 
been reached.  During the fault transient, the steady state models will result in serious 
false alarms.  Moreover, the fault symptoms may become weak after the new steady state 
due to controller feedback.  In addition, dynamic models must be used to isolate a 
controller fault and some actuator faults such as control valves.  By the way, in order to 
achieve a faster fault detection and isolation for safety concern, dynamic models are also 
desired. 
 
6.3 Extended Model Causal Graph 
 
6.3.1 Multi-model causal graph 
 
Multiple-model causal graph can be introduced to isolate input faults based on  
cause effect analysis of model residuals when there are no additional models available to 
reconstruct these process inputs.  
Multi-model approach was proposed for fault isolation (Simani, 2000).  The basic 
idea is to make most use of the knowledge about the process redundancy inherent in a 
system.  For example, in a saturated SG system, there is a one-to-one relation between the 
SG pressure and the SG temperature.  Therefore, any model as a function of SG pressure 
can always be used to derive a new model as a function of SG temperature.  The cause 
effect analysis on the residuals of these two models can then be performed to isolate the 
two faults. 
Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show two types of multiple models designed to isolate 
output faults and input faults, respectively.  In the design scheme shown in Figure 6.3, 
one output and all the inputs drive each model.  An output measurement fault affects only 
the residual of the model driven by this output variable.  Therefore, the output faults can 
then be isolated if there is no fault related to the inputs.  In the design scheme shown in 
Figure 6.4, each model is driven by all but one input and all the outputs, which generates 
a residual sensitive to all but one input fault.  Therefore, the input faults can then be 















                
















Figure 6.4.  Multiple models to isolate input faults. 



















Figure 6.5.  An example of multiple-model causal graph. 
 
Figure 6.5 shows an example of how to combine multi-model approach and 
regular model causal graph to obtain a multi-model causal graph.  If 1X  and 2X cannot 
be reconstructed from some other models, the multi-model causal graph still enables to 
perform cause effect analysis on the model residuals.  After the subsequent models have 
confirmed there are no faults related to variable 1Y  and 2Y , the following decision logic 
can be performed: 
a) If  021 ≈≈≈ RRR , there is no fault with respect to 1X , 2X  and 1Y  and 2Y . 
b) If both 1R  and 2R are significant, there is a fault with respect to nX . 
c) If  01 ≈R  but 02 ≠R , there is a fault with respect to 2X . 
d) If  02 ≈R  but 01 ≠R , there is a fault with respect to 1X . 
 
6.3.2 Model causal graph with hidden nodes 
 
Model causal graph can also be extended to include unmeasured variables.  This 
is useful to detect and isolate process faults.  Figure 6.6 shows an example.  In the figure, 
X1, X2, X3, and X4 correspond to four measured variables and H1 corresponds to an 
unmeasured variable.  In this case, the same reasoning logic can be used except that H1 
cannot be used as an independent residual generator.  It is necessary to prepare an explicit 
model instead of a data driven model to estimate the value of a hidden node.  If a data 





















Figure 6.6.  Model causal graph with hidden nodes. 
 
6.4  Model Causal Graph Approach with Fuzzy Inference Modeling  
 
Theoretically, an ANFIS model is able to approximate a system to any desired 
degree of accuracy.  However, in real situation, it is not always able to achieve this 
accuracy because a too complex model may be required.  Even if such a model can be 
obtained, the desired capability of generalization can still not be guaranteed.  
In order to achieve a perfect model, the input variables must always be cautiously 
selected.  On the one hand, the co-linearity between the input variables should be avoided 
since the least square method is used in training ANFIS.  On the other hand, the 
dimensionality of the inputs for the ANFIS models should be as few as possible.  In 
ANFIS, each input variable needs to be fuzzified into problem specific membership 
functions.  When the number of input variables is increased, the number of nodes in the 
second layer and the third layer of the ANFIS network will be increased exponentially. 
Correspondingly, the number of rules used in the system will be increased too.  This 
increase will not only have a severe influence on the training speed but also on the 
stability of the built models because the number of degrees of freedoms may be more 
than necessary.  The principle of choosing the number of input variables is that none of 
the redundant input variables should be retained in the ANFIS inputs.  
An efficient ANFIS model with parsimonious number of rules and membership 
functions can be achieved only through physically correct choice of inputs.  In order to 
characterize the behavior of a dynamic system, physically driving inputs are much more 







dynamic process are included in the model, much fewer delays will be required to 
perform the input-output mapping.  
Model causal graph method is in full agreement with the requirement of efficient 
ANFIS modeling using the system knowledge.  The physically involved inputs can be 
obtained through studying the cause-effect relationship.  Therefore, the ANFIS model is 
able to have most appropriate inputs when combined with cause effect analysis.  If 
known, some important non-linearity can also be directly captured through an 
unmeasured node in the model graph before it is presented as an input to an ANFIS 
model.  For example, the pressure loss can be assumed as a square function of the flow 
rate.  An unmeasured node can then be designed as the square of the flow rate in the 
model graph and is used as an input to the ANFIS model to estimate the pressure drop.  
By explicitly including nonlinear terms in the inputs, fewer membership functions will be 
needed in the resulting ANFIS models.  Model causal graph method helps to decompose 
a complex model into several small models.  The model decomposition can significantly 
enhance the performance of data driven modeling such as ANFIS when used for FDI. In 
order to achieve an accurate data driven model, the amount of data required is 
proportional to the number of inputs.  When a complex model is decomposed, much 
fewer inputs are related to each small model, and correspondingly, much fewer data will 
be required to train the small model than a complex model with a great number of inputs.  
In the case that sufficient knowledge is known about a system so that the rules 
and the member functions of the inputs can be specified, the training algorithm of the 
ANFIS system can also be adapted for this purpose.  Since ANFIS is a fuzzy model in 
nature, it is easy to integrate expert knowledge in different forms.  Knowledge in 
different confidence can be represented explicitly by appropriate choice of the shape of 
membership function. 
 
6.5 Procedures of Model Causal Graph Approach  
 
The following is a summary of the procedures to design a data driven model 
causal graph based FDI: 
• Design the model causal graph structure.  
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The structure can be obtained from process block diagram and control system 
design scheme.  
• Develop individual models. 
 In some cases, one model defined in the first step may be decomposed into 
several models in series.  The series of models correspond to the inclusion of some 
hidden nodes and some multi-model causal graph sub-modules. 
• Develop fault detection module.  
Appropriate thresholds should be specified for all the nodes.  A too small 
threshold may cause false alarms and a too big threshold may cause missing detection. 
• Develop causal reasoning algorithm. 
If only single faults are involved, the simple residual reasoning algorithm can be 
directly implemented.  If some dual faults are of concern for the FDI system, some 
extended reasoning schemes may need to be designed. 
The implementation of data driven model causal graph based FDI can be 
summarized as following steps: 
• Fault detection is fulfilled by monitoring the residual of each model.  
• For any abnormal model, the possible root causes are identified by tracking 
backwards until a model gives insignificant residual.  
• All the corrupted signals are reconstructed by tracking forward from the identified 
fault origin to the input nodes of the detected model.  
• Finally, cause effect reasoning is performed on the residuals for fault isolation. 
 
6.6 Application to Nuclear SG System 
 
Figure 6.7 shows the model causal graph of steam generator water level system 
for a PWR nuclear power plant. The models in series can be summarized as follows: 
 
Controller output (t)=f(steam flow rate(t)-feed water flow rate(t), SG level(t)-SG 
reference level(t)) 
 




























































































FCV flow rate (t)=f (FCV valve position (t), SG pressure (t)) 
 
FCV flow rate (t)=f (FCV valve position (t), SG pressure (t)) 
 
Steam flow rate (t+1)=f (feed water flow rate (t), SG pressure (t), hot leg temperature (t), 
cold leg temperature (t+1)) 
 
 Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 show a comparison between the estimated controller 
output and the indicated controller outputs for a controller gain offset fault and a feed 
water flow meter offset fault.  As can be seen, the residual can be used to isolate a 
controller fault as a local fault.  If some other faults related to the controller input signals 
such as feed water flow rate, steam flow rate, or SG level occur, the residual of the 
controller output remains close to zero.  The reason is that the controller model always 
uses indicated signals.  Even if some faults happen to the input signals of the controller, 
the controller model itself is still not violated.  By the way, the capability of isolating the 
controller fault as a local fault demonstrates that the ANFIS model is precise enough to 
capture the dynamic behavior of the controller. 
Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 show a comparison between the estimated valve 
position change and the indicated valve position change for a valve position offset fault 
and a feed water flow meter offset fault.  As can be seen, the residual can be used to 
isolate a valve position fault as a local fault.  If feed water flow meter offset fault 
happens, the residual of the valve position change remains close to zero.  The reason is 
that the valve position change is physically determined by the controller output signal.  
Figure 6.12 shows the model causal graph to estimate the feed water flow rate.  
Figure 6.13 shows the residual of feed water flow rate before and after the SG pressure is 
reconstructed for a feed water flow meter sensor fault.  The figure shows that the residual 
does not change much before and after all the input signals are reconstructed.  Therefore, 
the detected fault can be isolated as a local fault.  Figure 6.14 shows the residual of feed 
water flow rate before and after the SG pressure is reconstructed for SG pressure sensor 
fault. The reconstruction of SG pressure signal can fully explain the original residual.  
This indicates that the detected fault is a secondary fault and the fault can be isolated as a 











































Figure 6.9.  Controller output for feed water flow meter sensor fault. 
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Figure 6.11.  Change of valve position for feed water flow meter sensor fault. 
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Figure 6.14.  Model causal graph approach to isolate SG pressure sensor fault 
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Figure 6.15, Figure 6.16 and Figure 6.17 show the residual of the steam flow rate 
for a steam flow meter sensor fault, feed water flow meter sensor fault and SG pressure 
sensor fault respectively.  Figure 6.15 shows that the residual of steam flow rate does not 
change much before and after the SG pressure, the feed water flow rate, and the feed 
water flow rate and the SG pressure is reconstructed.  Therefore, the detected fault can be 
correctly isolated as a steam flow meter sensor fault. Figure 6.16 shows the residual of 
the steam flow rate for feed water flow meter sensor fault. The reconstruction of feed 
water flow rate signal can fully explain the original residual.  This indicates that the 
detected fault is a secondary fault and the fault can be isolated as a FCV flow meter 
sensor fault.  Figure 6.17 shows the residual of the steam flow rate for the SG pressure 
sensor fault, the reconstruction of the SG pressure signal can fully explain the original 
residual.  Therefore, the detected fault is a secondary fault and can be correctly isolated 
as a SG pressure sensor fault. 
In order to detect and isolate the SG narrow range level sensor fault, it is 
necessary to build a dynamic model to estimate SG level.  From physics point of view, 
The SG level can be determined by the SG mass and the SG thermal parameters.  For this 
reason, an unmeasured node, SG mass, is used to estimate the SG level.  It is expressed as 
a function of SG mass, SG pressure, SG temperature as well as feed water temperature, 
cold leg temperature and hot leg temperature, shown in Figure 6.18.  The SG mass can be 
estimated as a function of feed water flow rate and steam flow rate.  In fact, without using 
the SG mass as an explicit variable, it is extremely difficult to build a data driven model 
to estimate the SG level.  The reason is that the SG mass is the integral effect of the 
incoming feed water flow rate and the out-flowing steam flow rate.  A given value of SG 
mass may correspond to any value of FCV flow rate and steam flow rate.  In the specific 
case, a model using delay input does not help to track the dynamic behavior either since 
the SG indicated level would be ultimately brought back to its normal value after a SG 













































Figure 6.16.  Model causal graph approach to isolate feed water flow meter sensor fault. 
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Figure 6.17.  Model causal graph approach to isolate SG pressure sensor using 



















Figure 6.18.  Model causal graph of SG level measurement. 
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Figure 6.19 shows the residual of the SG level for a SG level sensor fault before 
and after the input signal is reconstructed. The residual does not change because of the 
input reconstruction for the detected fault.  This indicates that the fault is a local fault. 
The detected fault can then be successfully isolated.   
Figure 6.20 shows the residual of the steam flow rate for simultaneous feed water 
flow meter sensor fault and SG pressure sensor fault.  The original residual can be used to 
detect the fault. In order to isolate the faults, reconstructed residuals are used.  When 
either SG pressure or feed water flow rate is reconstructed, the residual can be reduced.  
However, the reconstruction of either signal is not enough to explain 100 percent of the 
original residual. Only when feed water flow rate and SG pressure are reconstructed can 
the residual reach minimal.  Therefore, from explaining maximal fault signature point of 
view, the simultaneous dual faults can be correctly isolated.  Figure 6.21 shows the 
residual of feed water flow rate for simultaneous feed water flow meter sensor fault and 
SG pressure sensor fault.  The original residual can be used to detect the fault.  After SG 
pressure is reconstructed, the residual of FCV flow rate can be reduced by 50%.  After 
both SG pressure and FCV position are reconstructed, the residual of FCV flow rate 
cannot be further reduced.  It can be concluded that SG pressure sensor is faulty and FCV 
valve position is healthy. However, the remained residual is still about 0.5%.  This 
fraction of the original residual must be explained by the assumption that the feed water 
flow meter sensor has a fault. 
 
6.7 Comparison with Other Approaches 
 
Although PCA based FDI and ANFIS model based FDI with structured residual 
design can be used for fault detection and isolation in some applications, model causal 
graph approach has some unique features in FDI system design and application to 
engineering problem.  
Both PCA based FDI and ANFIS model based FDI with structured residual 
design can only be designed when the possible faults are enumerable.  However, model 









































Figure 6.20.  Model causal graph approach to isolate feed water flow meter sensor fault 
and SG pressure sensor fault. 
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Figure 6.21.  Model causal graph approach to isolate SG pressure sensor fault and feed 
water flow meter sensor fault. 
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so it is not necessary to predefine the faults and their fault signatures.  To incorporate an 
automated detection and isolation into a large safety critical system such as nuclear 
power plants, this is a significant step moving forward to engineering application.   
Model causal graph approach achieves fault isolation by screening out a fault 
among all the possible fault candidates so that all the abnormal measurements can be 
explained. Therefore, there is no problem with misdiagnosing one fault as another.  
However, both PCA based FDI and ANFIS model based FDI with structured residual 
design do not have a safeguard against the possibility that some unknown faults may have 
the same fault signatures as defined for a fault in the fault dictionary.  Although 
structured residual design approach is able to avoid misdiagnosing one fault as another 
for the enumerated faults through manipulating the residual structures, it still cannot fully 
solve the problem. In addition, structured residual design is not always achievable 
especially for a non-linear system.  
Data driven model causal graph approach is able to meet the requirement for 
automation because only normal operation data are necessary to adaptively upgrade 
system models.  The fault signatures used for fault isolation are extracted from the 
understanding about the physical system instead of time consuming simulation or 
additional experiments. 
Causal graph approach allows accurate data driven modeling.  The most 
parsimonious model structure can be obtained through a model causal graph.  Therefore, 
it can improve the accuracy of the developed data driven models significantly.  In 
addition, the model structure is consistent with the system decomposition, so it helps to 
arrive at a modular FDI system.  
Because fault isolation is based on reasoning about model residuals, data driven 
model diagraph approach is also able to deal with simultaneous faults. 
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Chapter 7  
 
Picasso User Interface Design 
 
 
In order to show the effectiveness of the developed FDI for nuclear power plants, 
graphic user interface software has been successfully developed under the environment of 
Picasso-3, a user interface management system.  The software has the following 
functions: 
• Create a fault by changing the fault characteristic parameters. 
• Display essential parameters on the schematic of the reactor system. 
• Display the residual patterns specific to the fault. 
• Trend the process variables relevant to the fault, and echo the FDI results. 
The software has integrated SimPWR, a reactor system analysis code in 
FORTRAN, and the FDI code in Matlab, and the C++ code to control the graphic user 
interface.  SimPWR code is the driving code in the software, which makes it possible to 
advance the simulation time without interruption after the data are flushed to the user 
interface.  The Picasso Real Time Manager is controlled by a C++ code.  It keeps running 
in multithread mode while SimPWR is running so that the performance of the user 
interface display does not degrade due to possible time delay before the C++ code can get 




It is important to evaluate the overall performance of a newly developed FDI 
system. Although quite a few FDI methods have been available, all of these methods 
have their inherent weakness as compared with the others.  This is mainly due to the great 
challenges to the comprehensive requirements of an FDI system such as early detection 
and diagnosis, isolability, robustness, novelty identification, multiple fault identifiability, 
explanation facility, adaptability etc. Not a single FDI method is able to have all these 
desired characteristics. 
 125
Developing a graphic user interface (GUI) provides a convenient and cost 
effective way to make the evaluation.  A simulation code can be used to simulate the 
process behavior under normal and faulty conditions.  A fault can be created without 
much effort by changing some parameters related to the fault.  If only those data 
measured in actual plants are used for FDI implementation, the data can be reliable 
substitutes to the real data.  Some noises can be easily added to the input and the output 
of the simulation codes in order that the robustness of the FDI method can be tested.  
With regard to testing the adaptability of the FDI method, the operational power levels 
can be modified or some disturbances such as steam generator tube fouling factor can be 
changed on the GUI.  In addition, the GUI can also facilitate evaluating the FDI 
performance in detecting and isolating a single fault or multiple faults during a transient. 
 
7.2 Picasso Development Environment 
 
Picasso-3 is a User interface Management Systems (UIMS) developed as part of 
the Halden Reactor Project (Kjell, 1992, Jakobsen, 1994, Kjell, 1994(a), Kjell, 1994(b)).  
Figure 7.1 shows the schematic of the Picasso-3 system 
Picasso-3 has three components. Graphics Editor (GED) is the tool to design the 
user interface.  GED can be used to design some user interface components, draw some 
pictures, set up some dialogues and define dynamic attributes to some user interface 
components.  The User Interface database is where the GED saves the information 
containing the complete specification of the user interface.  Run-time manager (RTM) 
actually realizes the application's user interface.  Application process is the C++ code 
written by the user to guide how RTM is to generate the user interface as desired by the 
user.  Application Programmer's Interface (API) is a library of C++ functions that is 
linked to the application process to enable it to communicate with RTM.  
When an application is started, the application process calls functions in the API 
library in order to connect to the RTM. The RTM responds by loading the application 
user interface from its database and displaying it on the screen. By calling API functions 
periodically, RTM will continue to handle incoming events generated by the end user or 











































7.3 Application Process Design 
 
The schematic of the application process is shown in Figure 7.2. The SimPWR 
code is the main program.  Before entering the main body of the computation, initial_link 
is called in order to set up a connection with the Picasso RTM.  In the meanwhile, some 
initialization data for SimPWR calculation is transferred to RTM.  The main body of 
SimPWR code is run in a loop.  At the end of the loop, the simulation time advances one 
second.  The loop keeps running until the simulation time exceeds the specified 
maximum time.  When SimPWR code steps out of the loop, terminate_link is called in 
order to end Picasso gracefully.   
The application process program is written in multithread operation mode.  After 
it is connected with Picasso RTM, the function process_picasso is called periodically.  
On the one hand, it flushes the results calculated by SimPWR to Picasso-3 RTM so that 
they can be displayed on the block diagram of the reactor system and can be trended on 
trending plots.  On the other hand, it detects whether some parameters defined on the 
screen to create some faults have been changed by the end user.  If so, Process_picasso 
will transfer the changed parameters to SimPWR for a new simulation.  If 
Process_picasso detects the request from the end user for making fault detection and fault 
diagnosis, it will call the FDI module computing the residuals due to the fault and send 
the residuals to the RTM for display.  The FDI diagnostic results will also be transferred 
to the FDI diagnostic information window indicating what is the fault according to the 
FDI algorithm. 
The data exchange between Picasso-3 application process and SimPWR 
simulation code is through global variables.  These global variables return a structure in 
the C++ part of the application process and return a common block in the Fortran part of 
the application process.  The data exchange between the Picasso-3 RTM and the Picasso-
3 application process is through process structures and process variables. Both these data 
























































Two remote functions, stopApplication() and datMount(), are defined.  These two 
remote functions can be called directly by the user interface.  The function 
stopApplication() can help the API code end its task gracefully. The function datMount 
enables the user to input the samples and sampling interval for SimPWR code to return 
adequate amount of data for fault diagnosis. 
 
7.4 Descriptions of the Major Functions 
 
A description of the major functions is given in this section. 
1) Header 
The header files for Picasso API, MFC socket, FDI module, MATLAB as well as 
the C++ application process itself are included in this part of the code.  The header file 
for the C++ application process declares the function prototypes, structures for sensor 
characteristics, valve characteristics, controller characteristics, simulation data for 
display, and residuals. It also defines the global variables or the structures used in the 
application process. In addition, the global variables used to access the common blocks in 
the SimPWR FORTRAN code are also declared here. 
2) int Initialize_link() 
The functions of this function are as follows: 
• Initialization of the variables for display on the screen of end user. 
• Calling PfInitialize to connect the application process to the RTM. 
3) int process_picasso 
It is the kernel code to be executed periodically.  This code calls PfSend and 
PfFlush to update the variables in all the user’s windows. 
The required functions are as follows: 
• Calling some functions to transfer data from RTM to SimPWR in order to follow the 
recent changes in the parameters by end users. 
• Sending the most recent SimPWR simulation results to RTM. 
• Sending data to the FDI module or extract data from FDI module if FDI is requested. 
4) terminate_link 
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This function calls PfEndLoop to end the picasso application process. 
5) int32 createRecords() 
It calls PfReadScript to create records and variables according to specification in 
RecordDefs.pdat. 
6) int32 createVariables() 
This calls PfCreateVar to create variables locally in API and puts the information 
into a local buffer to be used by PfFlushCreateVar. 
7) void whenRtmConnects() 
PfInitialize calls this function.  It establishes connections with RTM and calls 
createRecords, createVariables and registerFunctions to let both RTM and the application 
process know the declarations of some process variables, structures and functions. 
8) int32 registerFunctions() 
This calls PfRegisterFunction to register the function stopApplication to terminate 
the API and the function datMount to receive the user’s input of samples and sampling 
interval from SimPWR code. 
9) int32 stopApplication() 
This is a function defined in API code but available to RTM as a remote function. 
Its function is to end the application.   
10) int32 datMount() 
This is a function defined in API code but available to RTM as a remote function. 
Its function is to receive the user’s input of samples and sampling interval from SimPWR 
code. 
11) void whenRtmDisconnects() 
This is a function to give a message if connection has been lost with RTM. 
12) RESD class_conversion 
This is a function to convert the residual array to the structure type RESD. 
13) void Pushdata() 
This is a function to convert a double matrix into a mxArray data structure used as 
input of Matlab function. 
14) void Extractdata() 
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This is a function to convert mxArray data structure used as output of Matlab 
function to a one-dimensional array.   
15) char* faultType() 
This is a function to determine the type of faults according to the residuals. 
 
7.5 User Interface Design 
 
The graphic user interface consists of five main windows.  
The main window is designed to facilitate switching between functional windows. 
It provides the following options: 
• Switch to the simulation window 
• Switch to the trending plot window 
• Switch to the FDI diagnostic results window 
• Switch to the fault creation window 
• End task. 
 
Figure 7.3 shows the options available on the main window of the graphic user 
interface. 
The fault creation window is designed to create faults by changing the parameters 
of the sensors, controllers, and actuators.  The following parameters can be changed on 
this window: 
• FCV1 valve stuck position 
• FCV1 offset 
• FCV1 time constant 
• FCV2 valve stuck position 
• FCV2 offset 
• FCV2 time constant 
• TCV1 valve stuck position 
• TCV1 offset 
• TCV1 time constant 
• TCV2 valve stuck position 
• TCV2 offset 
• TCV2 time constant 
• TCV3 valve stuck position 
































Figure 7.3.  The main window of the graphic user interface. 
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• TCV3 time constant 
• TCV4 valve stuck position  
• TCV4 offset 
• TCV4 time constant 
• Reactor power 
• FCV1 controller offset 
• Proportional gain of FCV1 controller 
• Integral gain of FCV1 controller 
• FCV2 controller offset 
• Proportional gain of FCV2 controller 
• Integral gain of FCV2 controller 
• SG1 narrow range level sensor drifting rate 
• SG2 narrow range level sensor drifting rate 
•  SG1 flow meter drifting rate 
• SG2 flow meter drifting rate 
 
Figure 7.4 shows the fault creation window of choices to change the parameters of 
sensors, controllers, and actuators.  
The trending plot window trends the following plots, which are important to 
represent the reactor system responses to the created faults: 
• Reactor nuclear power 
• Reactor power output 
• SG 1 water level 
• SG 2 water level 
• Hot leg temperature 
• Cold leg temperature 
• Feed water temperature 
• Feed water flow rate 
• SG 1 steam flow rate 
• TCV 1 flow rate 
• TCV 2 flow rate 
• TCV 3 flow rate 
• TCV 4 flow rate. 
 
The fault diagnostic result window shows the residual patterns of the following 
variables: 
• SG1 narrow range water level 
• SG2 narrow range water level 



























Figure 7.4.  Fault creation window to change fault related parameters. 
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• FCV2 flow rate 
• SG 1 steam flow rate 
• TCV1 flow rate 
• TCV2 flow rate 
• TCV3 flow rate 
• TCV4 flow rate 
• Hot leg temperature 
• Cold leg temperature 
• FCV1 valve position 
• FCV2 valve position 
• Feed water temperature (lumped loop) 
• Pressurizer temperature 
• Pressurizer level. 
 
Figure 7.5 shows the FDI diagnostic window under steady state conditions. 
The simulation window shows the following variables on the schematic of the 
reactor system: 
• Reactor nuclear power 
•  Hot leg temperature 
•  Cold leg temperature 
•  Pressure in the pressurizer 
•  Water level in the pressurizer 
•  Steam generator water level 
•  Feed water flow rate to SG1 
•  Feed water temperature 
•  Steam flow rate from SG1. 
 
Figure 7.6 shows the simulation window, in which the key parameters of the 



























































Figure 7.6.  FDI simulation window. 
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Chapter 8  
 






The preceding chapters presented the development of three approaches to fault 
diagnosis of nuclear power plant sensors and field devices and the applications to a PWR 
steam generator system. 
The application of PCA methods shows that both 2T statistic and Q statistic need 
to be used for fault detection in order to achieve low missing detection rate.  The fault 
directions jointly defined in the model space and in the residual space can increase the 
possibility of fault isolation.  This approach requires the least amount of system 
knowledge.  However, the developed fault detection module must be sensitive enough so 
that the plant measurements can be provided in time to the subsequent fault isolation 
module to define the fault direction in the model space.  In addition, fault isolation cannot 
be completed until a new steady state condition has been reached after a fault.  Because 
PCA is based on linear projection, this FDI system is only applicable to a linear static 
system.   
ANFIS can be used to learn accurate nonlinear models from plant data.  A 
combination of ANFIS modeling with structured residual design enables us to make fault 
isolation for a nonlinear system.  However, the desired residual structure can only be 
obtained through derived redundancy relationships. Correspondingly, very complicated 
model structure may be involved.  Moreover, in this approach, it is assumed that the 
possible faults are known.  If some additional faults are to be included, the entire FDI 
system needs to be redesigned. 
Model causal graph is developed as a new approach to FDI for nuclear plant 
sensors and field devices.  The significant feature of causal graph is that model inputs and 
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model outputs have cause effect relationship.  Because model structure is determined by 
system physics, most parsimonious data driven model structure can then be obtained.  
The fault isolation is based on cause effect analysis on model residuals, so it is not 
necessary to predefine possible faults and their fault signatures.  Model causal graph 
approach can also provide diagnosis results with higher confidence because a fault can 
usually be isolated using several models.  
The above three FDI methods are demonstrated with application to PWR UTSG 
system.  In the demonstration, all the selected sensor and actuator faults, including five 




The following conclusions are made from the research studies and the results 
presented in this thesis: 
• Analytical redundancy is the basis of modern FDI approaches.  It makes it possible to 
obtain stable fault signatures independent of fault magnitudes and initial operating 
conditions. 
• Data driven models are efficient to characterize the analytical relationship among 
measured variables.  These models can be adaptively upgraded during plant 
operation. 
• The qualification of the data plays a significant role in designing data driven FDI 
algorithms.  Any model extrapolation should be avoided in order to minimize false 
alarms. 
• Quasi-static model contains more information than a static model.  FDI algorithm 
based on quasi-static data enables to achieve earlier fault detection. 
• PCA based FDI algorithm has inherent connection with parity space approach.  The 
linear relationship among measured variables implying analytical redundancy can be 
consistently represented by the eigenvectors corresponding to the trivial components. 
Any deviation either in the model space or in the residual space will indicate a fault. 
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The fault direction jointly defined both in the model space and in the residual space 
provides better performance in fault isolation. 
• If the possible faults are known based on engineering judgments, a set of ANFIS 
models can be built to characterize the relationship between plant measurements.  
Through appropriate choice of model structures, structured residual design approach 
can be achieved for fault isolation. 
• Data driven model causal graph is a generic approach to fault diagnosis for nuclear 
power plants.  It is able to combine the reasoning capability of qualitative knowledge 
based approach and the strength in fault resolution of quantitative knowledge based 
method. Fault detection is fulfilled by monitoring the residual of each model.  Fault 
isolation is achieved by the cause effect analysis on the residuals.  
• System decomposition and local residual analysis is not only in full agreement with 
efficient data driven modeling but also conducive to FDI modularization.  
• It is not always possible to distinguish dual faults and one of the element faults. For 
instance, simultaneous feed water flow meter offset fault and SG narrow range level 
sensor fault cannot be isolated from feed water flow meter offset fault without using 
the SG wide range level signal since independent fault signatures are not available.  
In this case, SG WR level sensor signal must be used such that SG NR level sensor 
fault can be signified by checking its consistency with SG WR level signal.  
• A graphic user interface has been successfully developed to simulate the plant 
behavior for sensor, actuator and controller faults in nuclear power plants.  It provides 
a convenient environment to demonstrate the performance of any designed FDI 
algorithms. 
 
8.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
 
Some future work could be launched in order to integrate the proposed FDI 
algorithm into an engineering instrumentation and control system for nuclear power 
plants. 
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a) Development of a unified FDI framework, which is able to deal with system 
knowledge in different forms. 
b) Development of adaptive training algorithm for data driven models. 
c) Development of FDI algorithms capable of dealing with sensor faults, actuator 
faults, controller faults, and process faults simultaneously.  
d) Development of automatic causal reasoning algorithm on model residuals. 
e) Development of direction based classification algorithm to automate residual 
analysis. 
f) Development of novelty detection based algorithm for fault detection. 
In summary, the developed PCA based FDI algorithm and the structured residual 
design approach to FDI are satisfactory when applied to a PWR steam generator system 
when the possible faults are known.  Data driven model causal graph approach is a more 
systematic and general approach to fault detection and isolation for a large system where 
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fnn1{2}='Feed Water Flow Meter Drift Fault'; 
fnn1{3}='Steam Flow Meter Drift fault'; 
fnn1{4}='Steam Flow Meter Feed Flow Meter Drift Faults'; 
fnn1{5}='Feed Flow Meter Drift Fault and SG Level Sensor Drift Fault'; 
fnn1{6}='Steam Flow Meter Drift Fault and SG Level Sensor Drift Fault'; 
fnn1{7}='SG Pressure Sensor Drift Fault'; 
fnn1{8}='Feed Water Flow Meter Dridt fault & SG Pressure Sensor Drift Fault'; 
fnn1{9}='SG Level Sensor Dridt Fault & SG Pressure Sensor Drift Fault'; 
fnn1{10}='SG Level Sensor Dridt Fault'; 
fnn1{11}='Steam Flow Meter Drift Fault and SG Pressure Sensor Drift Fault'; 
mmp=length(fnn); 
  index=[1,5,9,24,27,29,31,32,33,36,37,39,40,57,70]; 
  indp=[2,4,7,8,9,11]; 
  noise=0.003; 
  dataNormal='E:\kzhao\SGdataNew\PWRrampNew.dat'; 
  temp=dlmread(dataNormal,' '); 
  A=temp(:,2:end); 
  BTP=[A(1:2:end,index)]; 
  BTP=ran(BTP,noise); 
  X_train=BTP; 
  BTP=[A(2:2:end,index)]; 
  BTP=ran(BTP,noise); 
  X_test=BTP; 
  X=X_train; 
  [n,m]=size(X); 
  fprintf(' The training set contains %d observations and %d variables\n', n,m); 
  [x,meanx,stdr]=zscore1(X); 
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  xtest=zscore1(X_test,meanx,stdr); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%PCA Model%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
  [Eigvec, TP, Eigp, TSQUARE] = PRINCOMP(x); 
  ttsum=sum(Eigp); 
  dps=Eigp/ttsum; 
  figure; 
  semilogy(dps); 
  axis([1,20,0,1]); 
  xlabel(' the order of the PCA model'); 
  ylabel(' the percentage of the total variance explained'); 
  a=input('the order of your model\n');  
% P is the Loading matrix, m rows, a colums; 
  P=Eigvec(:,1:a); 
% Eig is the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix which are eqaul to the variance of the transformed variables; 
  Eigval=Eigp; 
  Eig=diag(Eigp(1:a),0); 
  Eig1=diag(Eigp,0); 
  T=TP(:,1:a); 
  figure; 
  plot(TP(:,1),TP(:,2),'r*'); 
  figure; 
  plot(P(:,1),P(:,2),'r*'); 
  [nn,mm]=size(x); 
  sse_test=[]; 
  sse_train=[]; 
  for aa=1:1:mm 
  P=Eigvec(:,1:aa); 
  xtrain_pred=x*P*P'; 
  ss=(xtrain_pred-x)*(xtrain_pred-x)'; 
  ssp=trace(ss); 
  sse_train=[sse_train,ssp]; 
  xtest_pred=xtest*P*P'; 
  ss=(xtest_pred-xtest)*(xtest_pred-xtest)'; 
  ssp=trace(ss); 
  sse_test=[sse_test,ssp]; 
end; 
  figure; 
  semilogy(sse_train,'b'); 
  hold on; 
  semilogy(sse_test,'r'); 
  hold off; 
  pause; 
  a=input('the order of your model\n');  
  P=Eigvec(:,1:a); 
  Eig=diag(Eigp(1:a),0); 
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  Eig1=diag(Eigp,0); 
  mv=length(indp); 
  [nn,mm]=size(xtest); 
  xtest_pred=xtest*P*P'; 
  for ipp=1:1:mv 
      figure; 
      plot(xtest_pred(1:20:nn,indp(ipp)),'b+'); 
      hold on; 
      plot(xtest(1:20:nn,indp(ipp)),'ro'); 
  end; 
%%%%fault detection for PCA based on T square and Q statistics %%% 
  [T2lim]=Tlim(confidence,n,a); 
% Qlim(squared prediction error) is to measure the total sum of variations in the residual space, 
  [Qlim]=QFlim(confidence,a,m,Eigval); 
for iclass=1:1:mmp 
 filem=fnn{iclass}; 
  for inn=1:1:1 
      if iclass==1  
          fileName=filem; 
          eval(['load ', fileName]); 
      BT=PWRrampNew(:,2:end);   
      norm00=PWRrampNew(1,2:end);  
      norm100=[]; 
      for ivv=1:1:100 
          norm100=[norm100;norm00]; 
      end; 
      else 
      fileName=[filem,num2str(inn)]; 
      eval(['load ', fileName]); 
      BT=Faultdata(:,2:end); 
      BT=[BT]; 
end; 
  note=fnn1{iclass}; 
  BTP=[BT(1:end,index)]; 
  BT=BTP; 
  BT=ran(BT,noise); 
  fprintf('Detecting Fault:%s\n',fnn1{iclass}); 
  [TTSQ,QQSQ,miss,miss1,miss2,fal1,fal2] = dtectPCA(BT,meanx,stdr,Eig,P,T2lim,Qlim); 
  figure; 
  [nn1,mm1]=size(TTSQ); 
  plot(TTSQ(1:1:mm1),'b*'); 
  hold on; 
  TTSQ_lim=ones(1,mm1).*T2lim; 
  plot(TTSQ_lim(1:1:mm1),'r') 
  note1=['detecting ',note,' based on T square statistics']; 
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  xlabel('sample'); 
  ylabel('T square statistics'); 
  title(note1); 
  hold off; 
  figure; 
  plot(QQSQ(1:1:mm1),'b*'); 
  hold on; 
  [nn1,mm1]=size(QQSQ); 
  QQSQ_lim=ones(1,mm1).*Qlim; 
  plot(QQSQ_lim(1:1:mm1),'r'); 
  note2=['detecting ',note,' based on Q statistics']; 
  xlabel('sample'); 
  ylabel('Q statistics'); 
  title(note2); 





  ind01=[];ind02=[];ind03=[];ind04=[]; 
  ind11=[];ind12=[];ind13=[];ind14=[]; 
  [mn1,mn2]=size(BT); 
  pattern=[]; 
  for iclass=2:1:mmp 
       filem=fnn{iclass}; 
  for inn=1:1:1 
      fileName=[filem,num2str(inn)]; 
      note=fileName; 
      eval(['load ', fileName]); 
      BT=Faultdata(:,2:end); 
      xid=[BT(end,index)]; 
      xid=ran(xid,noise); 
  xid=(xid-meanx); 
  [CONT,RES]=ident1(xid,T2lim,Qlim,a,P,Eigvec,Eig1); 
  CONT1=sort(abs(CONT)); 
  ma=length(CONT); 
  RES1=sort(abs(RES)); 
  mb=length(RES); 
  if CONT1(ma)~=0.0 indd1=find(abs(CONT)==CONT1(ma)); end; 
  ind01=[ind01,indd1]; 
  if RES1(mb)~=0.0 indd1=find(abs(RES)==RES1(mb)); end; 
  ind02=[ind02,indd1]; 
  end; 
  figure; 
  bar(1:1:15,CONT); 
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  title(note); 
  figure; 
  bar(1:1:15,RES); 

























fnns{1}='Feed flow meter offset'; 
fnns{2}='Steam flow meter offset'; 
fnns{3}='Feed flow meter offset and Steam flow meter offset'; 
fnns{4}='Feed flow meter offset and SG Level sensor offset'; 
fnns{5}='Steam flow meter offset and SG Level sensor offset'; 
fnns{6}='SG pressure sensor offset'; 
fnns{7}='Feed flow meter offset and SG Pressure sensor fault'; 
fnns{8}='Feed flow meter offset and FCV Offset'; 
fnns{9}='Steam flow meter offset and FCV Offset'; 
fnns{10}='FCV Offset'; 
fnns{11}='SG Level sensor offset and SG Pressure sensor fault'; 
fnns{12}='SG Level sensor fault'; 


















[Eigvec, TP, Eigp, TSQUARE] = PRINCOMP(x); 
  ttsum=sum(Eigp); 
  dps=Eigp/ttsum; 
  figure; 
  plot(dps); 
  xlabel(' the order of the PCA model'); 
  ylabel(' the percentage of the total variance explained'); 
  a=input('the order of your model\n');  
% P is the Loading matrix, m rows, a colums; 
  P=Eigvec(:,1:a); 
  Eigval=Eigp; 
  Eig=diag(Eigp(1:a),0); 
  Eig1=diag(Eigp,0); 
% T is the score matrix being the corordinates in the new corordinate system spanned by principal components, 
T=TP(:,1:a); 
 figure; 
  plot(TP(:,1),TP(:,2),'r*'); 
  figure; 
















  fileName=[filem,num2str(inn)]; 






















  fileName=[filem,num2str(inn)]; 
















predict = BV*P*P'; 
if inn==7 
    BVV=norm80; 
else 




























    XXX=[];GGG=[]; 
    for inn=1:1:7 
        VVV1=[]; 
        VVV2=[]; 
        for idd=1:mpp 
            VVV1=[VVV1,Sdd(iclass).Case(inn).CosTheta2(itime,idd)]; 
            VVV2=[VVV2,Sdd(iclass).Case(inn).CosTheta1(itime,idd)]; 
        end; 
    XXX=[XXX;VVV1];     
    GGG=[GGG;VVV2]; 










    ZZZ2=[];ZZZ1=[]; 
    for itime=700:1:700 
        for inn=2:1:2 
        YYYT=AM(itime).YYY2(iclass).GGG(inn,:); 
        YYYB=AM(itime).YYY1(iclass).XXX(inn,:); 
        ZZZ1=[ZZZ1;YYYB]; 
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        ZZZ2=[ZZZ2;YYYT];  
        figure; 
        bar([ZZZ1;ZZZ2]');colormap(cool); 
        title(['residual direction in the model space and the residual space']);    
        ylabel(fnns{iclass}); 
        xlabel('Fault number'); 








  warning off; 


































ptest_title{1}='ANFIS model to estimate FCV valve position';  
ptest_title{2}='ANFIS model to estimate FCV flow rate';  
ptest_title{3}='ANFIS model to estimate SG steam flow rate';  
ptest_title{4}='ANFIS model to estimate SG level';  
ptest_title{5}='ANFIS model to estimate SG Pressure';  
 
ytext{1}='FCV valve position(%)'; 
ytext{2}='FCV flow rate(%)'; 































































   if ipp==1 
    bbb=XYY(:,ipp)-(BBTT(end,indv(ipp))-BBTT(end-1,indv(ipp)));     
    if bbb >= 0.05 
        bbb=0.05; 
    elseif bbb <= -0.05     
        bbb=-0.05; 
    end;    
    Fault(iclass).Variable(ipp).Residual=bbb; 
   else 
   bbb=(XYY(:,ipp)-BBTT(end,indv(ipp)))./BBTT(end,indv(ipp));  
       if bbb >= 0.05 
        bbb=0.05; 
    elseif bbb <= -0.05     
        bbb=-0.05; 
    end;    
   Fault(iclass).Variable(ipp).Residual=bbb; 








   YT=[]; 
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   for ivar=1:1:length(indv) 
         YT=[YT,Fault(iclass).Variable(ivar).Residual(end,1)]; 
   end; 
   Y=[Y;YT]; 
end;    
BAR(Y); 
ser=num2str(inn); 
title(['Residual Patterns based on ANFIS Local Model Fault Magnitude=Case',ser]); 





Appendix D  C++ Code for user interface 
 
#ifndef MLF_V2 
















#define BOOL_IS_KEYWORD 1 
#include <fstream> 
#include <afxsock.h>  // MFC socket extensions 











// Simulator Common Blocks 
 
extern "C" struct 
{ 
    float time, Seconds, deltat; 
} TIME; 
 
extern "C" struct 
{ 
 int Ntime; 
 float Tmax, Dtmin, Dtmax; 
 int ITYPEacc; 




extern "C" struct  
{ 




extern "C" struct 
{ 
  float VTBV[10], VSDV[10], VADV1, VSRV1[10], VADV2, VSRV2[10], 
     VSLbrk, VTCV[4], FlowTBV[10], FlowSDV[10], FlowADV1, 
  FlowSRV1, FlowADV2, FlowSRV2, FlowSLbrk, FlowSL1, 
  FlowSL2, FlowTCV[4], FlowSG1, FlowSG2, hSG1, hSG2; 
} BOPFLOW; 
 
extern "C" struct 
{ 
 float DDDtime,DDDQthnew,DDDQrxnew,DDDQtrans,DDDFlowc, 
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       DDDFlow1,DDDFlow2,DDDTrxnew,DDDTfuelHot1,DDDTcladMAX, 
       DDDTinfnew,DDDTAVEInd,DDDTaveREF,DDDTold16,DDDTold14,DDDTCL1Ind, 
       DDDTold18,DDDTCL2Ind,DDDTold5,DDDTHL1Ind,DDDTHL2Ind,DDDTsat, 
       DDDMDNBR,DDDWithDrawal,DDDCb, 
       DDDRhoTot,DDDDeltaRhoFuel,DDDDeltaRhoMod,DDDDeltaRhoB,DDDRhocr, 




extern "C" struct 
{ 
float PPPSeconds,PPPPp,PPPPprz,PPPQhtrKw,PPPGPMspray, 
      PPPPrzLvlP,PPPRefLvlP,PPPGPMcharge,PPPGPMletdwn,PPPFlowSIS, 
      PPPmporv,PPPFlowPrzSRV,PPPGPMmsrg; 
} PPP; 
 
extern "C" struct 
{ 
float SSSSeconds,SSSPs10,SSSPs10Ind,SSSPs20,SSSPs20Ind, 
      SSSTsat10,SSSTsat20,SSSFeedTemp,SSSFlowSG1, 
      SSSFlowSG1Ind,SSSFlowfd1,SSSFlowfd1Ind,SSSFCV1P, 
      SSSFlowEFW1,SSSSGLvl1WR,SSSSGLvl1NR,SSSSGLvl1WRInd, 
      SSSSGLvl1NRInd,SSSSG1Mass,SSSSGRefWR,SSSSGRefNR,SSSFlowSG2, 
      SSSFlowSG2Ind,SSSFlowfd2,SSSFlowfd2Ind,SSSFCV2P,SSSFlowEFW2, 
      SSSSGLvl2WR,SSSSGLvl2NR,SSSSGLvl2WRInd,SSSSGLvl2NRInd,SSSSG2Mass, 
      SSSFlowSLbrk; 
} SSS; 
 
extern "C" struct 
{ 
float BBBSeconds,BBBFlowTCV1,BBBFlowTCV2,BBBFlowTCV3,BBBFlowTCV4, 
      BBBTCVposP1,BBBTCVposP2,BBBTCVposP3,BBBTCVposP4; 
} BBB; 
 





extern "C" struct 
{ 
 float SensorOffset[20],SensorDrift[20],SensorNoise[20],SensorSpan[20]; 
} SENSORPROPERTIES; 
 






extern "C" struct 
{ 
 
 float SGLvl1,SG1IndWRLvl,SG1IndNRLvl,SGLvl2,SG2IndWRLvl,SG2IndNRLvl, 




extern "C" struct 
{ 




extern "C" struct 
{ 
 float Wturb, Wload, Pcond, Phdr, TCVposition[4], FCV1, 





extern "C" struct 
{ 
 float DeltaPcp1, DeltaPcp2; 
 int  nfeedpumps; 
 float DeltaPEFW, FeedTempRate, FeedDuration, FeedTempData[100], FeedTempTime[100]; 




extern "C" struct 
{ 
 float Told[30]; 
} PRIMTEMPS; 
extern "C" struct 
{ 
 float Pprz,PrzLvlP; 
} PRZADD; 
 
extern "C" struct 
{ 




   static int threadRunning = 0; 
   static void GUIThread(void *ptr) 
{ 
   threadRunning = 1; 
   PfMainLoop(); 
   threadRunning = 0; 
   return; 
} 
 
extern "C" Code(); 
 
extern "C" 
void whenRtmDisconnects(int status, const char *msg) 
{ 
  printf( "Lost contact with RTM %s\n",applName); 
  
  return; 
} 
extern "C" 
void whenRtmConnects(int status, const char *msg) 
{  
    if ( status & PfCrtmResume ) 
    { 
     printf("Connection established\n"); 




/*Create records, variables and functions */ 
    if (createRecords() !=OK) quit(); 
    if (createVariables() !=OK) quit(); 
    if (registerFunctions() !=OK) quit(); 
 
    PfFlush();   
  
/*Create processhandler to be called every time interval if not already created*/ 
 
 return ; 
} 
      
extern "C" 
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int process(int i) 
{ 
SIMCONTROL.Tmax=TIME.time+1.0/3600; 






    unsigned long guiThread; 
 int error = 0; 
 Vardd=0; 
    SIMCONTROL.Tmax=(float)(0.1/3600); 
// Calls made in the initialize_link function 
 printf("\n\n"); 
    PfInitialize("NERI","NERI","rtm",NULL,0,0,whenRtmConnects,whenRtmDisconnects); 
 
/*Create processhandler to be called every time interval if not already created*/ 
 
    if ( processHandlerId == PfBADINDEX) 
 { PfSetProcessHandler(process_picasso, 5000); 
         if ( apiError !=OK)printf("PfsetProcessHandler failed\n"); 
      else 
    printf("PfsetProcessHandler OK \n"); 
 } 
    guiThread=_beginthread(GUIThread, 0, NULL); 
    if (apiError != OK) 
    { 
         printf("Pfinitialize failed\n"); 
 } 
 else 
    { 
        initialControllerData(); 
        initialsensorData(); 
        initialFCVData(); 
        initialTCVData(); 
        initPower(); 
       return(0); 
   PfFlush();   
 }  
 TRACE( "initialize_link: finished\n" ); 




int process_picasso(int i) 
{ 
 
   int error=0; 
   int numcc; 
   int inum,ierror,ii,jj; 
   float dusy; 
   char* FaultTemp; 
   FILE * fid50; 
   FILE * fid20; 
   double *VV; 
   double VV1[39]; 
   float rsd[38]={0.0}; 
   if (PfIsConnected()) 
   { 
 if  (Vardd == 1) 
   { 
    VV=getData(); 
 VV1[0]=Vardd; 
 for (int ikk=0;ikk<38;++ikk) 
 { 




 YY = (mxArray *)mlfFault_det_all(XX);  
 fid50=fopen("Gmdh_residual.dat","r"); 
    inum=0; 
    do 
 { 
    ierror=fscanf(fid50,"%g",&dusy); 
 if (ierror==EOF) break; 
    rsd[inum]=dusy; 
 printf(" rsd = %g\n", rsd[inum]); 
    inum++; 
 } 
    while (ierror!=EOF); 
    fclose(fid50); 
 
    reds=Class_conversion(rsd); 
    ExtractData(YY); 
    FaultTemp=FaultType(); 
    for (numcc=0; *(FaultTemp+numcc) != NULL; ++numcc) 
  FaultEcho[numcc]=*(FaultTemp+numcc);  
    Vardd=0; 
 } 
 
 if  (Vardd == 2) 
   { 
    VV=getData(); 
 VV1[0]=Vardd; 
 for (int ikk=0;ikk<38;++ikk) 
 { 




 YY1 = (mxArray *)mlfFault_det_all(XX);  
    ExtractData(YY1); 
    sse_trans=diags[0]; 
 Vardd=2; 
 } 
 if  (Vardd == 3) 













      FCVData(); 
      TCVData(); 
    ControllerData(); 
    sensorData(); 
 
 myGlobalTime=PPP.PPPSeconds; 
 PfSend (controller1_id); 
 PfSend (controller2_id); 
 PfSend (FCV1_id); 
 PfSend (FCV2_id); 
 PfSend (TCV1_id);  
 PfSend (TCV2_id); 
 PfSend (TCV3_id); 
 PfSend (TCV4_id); 
 PfSend (SG1_id); 
 PfSend (SG2_id); 
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 PfSend (Flowmeter1_id); 
 PfSend (Flowmeter2_id); 
 PfSend (simulation_id);  
 PfSend (fdi_id); 
 PfSend (reds_id); 













































// Send message to log. 
 
extern "C"  
int send_log_message(const char *pMsg) 
{ 
 int error = 0; 






 return 0.0; 
} 
 
/* Standard error macro for reporting API errors */ 
 
 #define PERR(bSuccess, api){if(!(bSuccess)) printf("%s:Error %d from %s \ 
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    on line %d\n", __FILE__, GetLastError(), api, __LINE__);} 
 extern "C" 
 void clsgp( ) 
 { 
  HANDLE hConsole; 
  hConsole = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE); 
 
    COORD coordScreen = { 0, 0 };    /* here's where we'll home the 
                                        cursor */ 
    BOOL bSuccess; 
    DWORD cCharsWritten; 
    CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi; /* to get buffer info */ 
    DWORD dwConSize;                 /* number of character cells in 
                                        the current buffer */ 
 
    /* get the number of character cells in the current buffer */ 
 
    bSuccess = GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo( hConsole, &csbi ); 
    PERR( bSuccess, "GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo" ); 
    dwConSize = csbi.dwSize.X * csbi.dwSize.Y; 
 
    /* fill the entire screen with blanks */ 
 
    bSuccess = FillConsoleOutputCharacter( hConsole, (TCHAR) ' ', 
    dwConSize, coordScreen, &cCharsWritten ); 
    PERR( bSuccess, "FillConsoleOutputCharacter" ); 
 
    /* get the current text attribute */ 
 
    bSuccess = GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo( hConsole, &csbi ); 
    PERR( bSuccess, "ConsoleScreenBufferInfo" ); 
 
    /* now set the buffer's attributes accordingly */ 
 
    bSuccess = FillConsoleOutputAttribute( hConsole, csbi.wAttributes, 
    dwConSize, coordScreen, &cCharsWritten ); 
    //PERR( bSuccess, "FillConsoleOutputAttribute" ); 
 
    /* put the cursor at (0, 0) */ 
 
    bSuccess = SetConsoleCursorPosition( hConsole, coordScreen ); 
    PERR( bSuccess, "SetConsoleCursorPosition" ); 























     int32 registerFunctions() 
{ 
     PfTArg formals[2]; 
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/*Register a function for terminating the program*/ 
    PfRegisterFunction("stopApplication",stopApplication,0,NULL); 
    if (apiError !=OK) 
    printf ("PfRegisFunction failed (%s)\n", applName); 
/*Register a function for receiving data points calculated by NCSU for diagnosis*/ 
    formals[0].dtype=PfCInt; 
    formals[0].size=1;  
    formals[1].dtype=PfCFloat; 
    formals[1].size=1;  
    PfRegisterFunction("datMount",datMount,2,formals); 
    if (apiError !=OK) 
    printf ("PfRegisFunction failed (%s)\n", applName); 
    return OK; 
} 
  
   
   
extern "C"  
  int32 createRecords() 
{ 
 int32 numErrors; 
 char *Filename="RecordDefs.pdat"; 
 numErrors=PfReadScript(Filename);//PfReadScript creates records and variables according to specification in NERI.Pdat  
 if (apiError!=OK) 
 printf ( "pfReadScript reported  errors for %s\n",Filename); 
 else 
 printf ( "pfReadScript is done\n"); 
 return apiError; 
} 
  
extern "C"  
   int32 createVariables() 
{ 
/*PfCreateVar creates the variable locally in api and puts the information into a local buffer 
to be used by PfFlushCreateVar.*/ 
 
a_id= PfCreateVar("a1",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&a1); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("a1 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding a1 failed\n"); 
  b_id= PfCreateVar("b1",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&b1); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("b1 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding b1 failed\n"); 
 c_id= PfCreateVar("c1",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&c1); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("c1 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding c1 failed\n"); 
 d_id= PfCreateVar("d1",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&d1); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("d1 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding d1 failed\n"); 
  e11_id= PfCreateVar("e11",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&e11); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("e11 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding e11failed\n"); 
 e12_id= PfCreateVar("e12",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&e12); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("e12 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding e12 failed\n"); 
 e13_id= PfCreateVar("e13",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&e13); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
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 printf("e13 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding e13 failed\n"); 
 e14_id= PfCreateVar("e14",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&e14); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("e14 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding e14 failed\n"); 
 f11_id= PfCreateVar("f11",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&f11); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("f11 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding f11failed\n"); 
 f12_id= PfCreateVar("f12",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&f12); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("f12 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding f12 failed\n"); 
 g11_id= PfCreateVar("g11",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&g11); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("g11 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding e11failed\n"); 
 g12_id= PfCreateVar("g12",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&g12); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("g12 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding g12 failed\n"); 
 g13_id= PfCreateVar("g13",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&g13); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("g13 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding g13 failed\n"); 
 g14_id= PfCreateVar("g14",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&g14); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("g14 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding g14 failed\n"); 
 sse_id= PfCreateVar("sse_trans",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&sse_trans); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("sse_trans added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding sse_trans failed\n"); 
 
 G_Perload_id= PfCreateVar("G_Perload",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&G_Perload); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("Perload added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding Perload failed\n"); 
 
 G_aload_id= PfCreateVar("G_aload",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&G_aload); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("aload added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding aload failed\n"); 
 
G_bload_id= PfCreateVar("G_bload",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&G_bload); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("bload added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding bload failed\n"); 
 
 G_Refload_id= PfCreateVar("G_Refload",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&G_Refload); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("Reference Load added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding Refload failed\n"); 
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 G_PerloadMin_id= PfCreateVar("G_PerloadMin",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&G_PerloadMin); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("PerloadMin added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding PerloadMin failed\n"); 
 
 G_Duration_id= PfCreateVar("G_Duration",PfCDouble, NULL,0,&G_Duration); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("Duration added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding Duration failed\n"); 
 
 
 Var_Id= PfCreateVar("Vardd",PfCInt, NULL,0,&Vardd); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("Vardd added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding Vardd failed\n"); 
 
controller1_id=PfCreateVar("controller1",PfCRecord, "Controller",0,&controller1); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("controller1 added\n"); 
 else 
printf("adding controller1 failed\n"); 
controller2_id=PfCreateVar("controller2",PfCRecord, "Controller",0,&controller2); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("controller2 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("adding controller2 failed\n"); 
 FCV1_id=PfCreateVar("FCV1",PfCRecord, "Valve",0,&FCV1); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("FCV1 added\n"); 
 else 
printf("Adding FCV1 failed\n"); 
FCV2_id=PfCreateVar("FCV2",PfCRecord, "Valve",0,&FCV2); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("FCV2 added\n"); 
 else 
printf("Adding FCV2 failed\n"); 
TCV1_id= PfCreateVar("TCV1",PfCRecord, "Valve",0,&TCV1); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("TCV1 added\n"); 
 else 
printf("Adding TCV1 failed\n"); 
TCV2_id= PfCreateVar("TCV2",PfCRecord, "Valve",0,&TCV2); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("TCV2 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding TCV2 failed\n"); 
TCV3_id= PfCreateVar("TCV3",PfCRecord, "Valve",0,&TCV3); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("TCV3 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding TCV3 failed\n"); 
TCV4_id= PfCreateVar("TCV4",PfCRecord, "Valve",0,&TCV4); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("TCV4 added\n"); 
 else 
printf("Adding TCV4 failed\n"); 
SG1_id= PfCreateVar("SG1",PfCRecord, "Sensor",0,&SG1); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("SG1 added\n"); 
SG2_id= PfCreateVar("SG2",PfCRecord, "Sensor",0,&SG2); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("SG2 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding SG2 failed\n"); 
Flowmeter1_id= PfCreateVar("Flowmeter1",PfCRecord, "Sensor",0,&Flowmeter1); 
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 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("Flow1 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding Flow1 failed\n"); 
 
Flowmeter2_id= PfCreateVar("Flowmeter2",PfCRecord, "Sensor",0,&Flowmeter2); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("Flow2 added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("Adding Flow2 failed\n"); 
simulation_id= PfCreateVar("simulation",PfCRecord, "Simulation",0,&simulation); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("simulation added\n"); 
 else 
 printf("adding simulation failed\n"); 
fdi_id= PfCreateVar("fdi",PfCRecord, "FDIF",0,&fdi); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("fdi added\n"); 
 else 
printf("Adding FDIF failed\n"); 
reds_id= PfCreateVar("reds",PfCRecord, "RESD",0,&reds); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("Residual added\n"); 
 else 
printf("Adding Residual failed\n"); 
 
diags_id= PfCreateArray("diags",PfCDouble, 20,NULL,true,diags); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("diagnostic information added\n"); 
 else 
printf("Adding diagnostic information failed\n"); 
 
FaultEcho_id= PfCreateArray("FaultEcho",PfCUnsignedChar, 30,NULL,true,FaultEcho); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
 printf("Fault Echo information added\n"); 
 else 
printf("Adding Fault Echo information failed\n"); 
 
time_id = PfCreateVar("myGlobalTime", PfCInt, NULL, 1, &myGlobalTime); 
 if(apiError == OK) 
    printf("variable myGlobalTime added\n"); 
  else 




if ( apiError ==OK) 
   printf ( "All variables successively created\n"); 





RESD  Class_conversion(float* rsd) 
{  
/* 
  reds.level_SG1=-(double)rsd[0]; //SG1 water level; 
  reds.level_SG2=-(double)rsd[1]; //SG2 water level; 
  reds.flow_FCV1=-(double)rsd[2]; //FCV1 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_FCV2=-(double)rsd[3]; //FCV2 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_TCV1=-(double)rsd[4]; //TCV1 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_TCV2=-(double)rsd[5]; //TCV2 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_TCV3=-(double)rsd[6];  //TCV3 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_TCV4=-(double)rsd[7]; // TCV4 flow rate; 
  reds.T_hl=(double)rsd[8];        // hot leg temperature; 
  reds.T_cl=(double)rsd[9];        //cold leg temperature; 
  reds.T_FCV1=(double)rsd[10];  //feed water temperature; 
  reds.T_FCV2=(double)rsd[11];  //feed water temperature(lumped loop); 
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  reds.T_PRZ=(double)rsd[12];   //pressurizer temperature; 
  reds.L_PRZ=(double)rsd[13];   //presurizer level; 
  reds.set_power=(double)rsd[14]; // power load demand; 
  reds.set_level=(double)rsd[15];   //SG water level setpoint; 
  reds.ctl_level=(double)rsd[16];  //  SG level controller output 
  return reds; 
*/ 
  reds.level_SG1=(double)rsd[0]; //SG1 water level; 
  reds.level_SG2=0.0;            //SG2 water level; 
  reds.flow_FCV1=(double)rsd[1]; //FCV1 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_FCV2=0.0; //FCV2 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_steam=(double)rsd[3]; //steam flow rate; 
  reds.flow_TCV1=(double)rsd[4]; //TCV1 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_TCV2=(double)rsd[5]; //TCV2 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_TCV3=(double)rsd[6];  //TCV3 flow rate; 
  reds.flow_TCV4=(double)rsd[7]; // TCV4 flow rate; 
  reds.T_hl=0.0;        // hot leg temperature; 
  reds.T_cl=0.0;        //cold leg temperature; 
  reds.FCV1pos=(double)rsd[2];  //FCV1 valve position; 
  reds.FCV2pos=0.0;            //FCV2 valve position; 
  reds.T_FCV=0.0;  //feed water temperature(lumped loop); 
  reds.T_PRZ=0.0;   //pressurizer temperature; 
  reds.L_PRZ=0.0;   //presurizer level; 
  reds.set_power=0.0; // power load demand; 
  reds.set_level=0.0;   //SG water level setpoint; 
  reds.ctl_level=0.0;  //  SG level controller output 




 void FDIFData() 
{  
  a1=SSS.SSSSGLvl1NR; 
  b1=SSS.SSSSGLvl2NR; 
  c1=SSS.SSSFlowfd1; 
  d1=SSS.SSSFlowfd2; 
  e11=BBB.BBBFlowTCV1; 
  e12=BBB.BBBFlowTCV2; 
  e13=BBB.BBBFlowTCV3; 
  e14=BBB.BBBFlowTCV4; 
  f11=simulation.power=DDD.DDDQthnew; //reactor power 
  f12=simulation.load=DDD.DDDWturb; //reactor power output 
  g11=DDD.DDDTold5;        // hot leg temperature;? 
  g12=DDD.DDDTold14; //cold leg temperature;? 
  g13=TREND.FeedTemp;//feed water temperature; 
  g14=TREND.FeedTemp;//feed water temperature(lumped loop); 
  fdi.set_power=BOPLOAD.aload; // power load demand; 
  fdi.set_level=SSS.SSSSGRefNR;   //SG water level setpoint; 
  fdi.ctl_level=0.0;   //  SG level controller  
 
  fdi.level_SG1=(SSS.SSSSGLvl1NR-aa[0])/aa[0]; 
  fdi.level_SG2=(SSS.SSSSGLvl2NR-aa[1])/aa[1]; 
  fdi.flow_FCV1=(SSS.SSSFlowfd1-aa[2])/aa[2]; 
  fdi.flow_FCV2=(SSS.SSSFlowfd2-aa[3])/aa[3]; 
  fdi.flow_TCV1=(BBB.BBBFlowTCV1-aa[4])/aa[4]; 
  fdi.flow_TCV2=(BBB.BBBFlowTCV2-aa[5])/aa[5]; 
  fdi.flow_TCV3=(BBB.BBBFlowTCV3-aa[6])/aa[6]; 
  fdi.flow_TCV4=(BBB.BBBFlowTCV4-aa[7])/aa[7]; 
  fdi.T_hl=(DDD.DDDTold5-aa[9])/aa[9];         
  fdi.T_cl=(DDD.DDDTold14-aa[8])/aa[8];  
  fdi.T_PRZ=(PPP.PPPPprz-aa[10])/aa[10];    
  fdi.L_PRZ=(PPP.PPPPrzLvlP-aa[11])/aa[11]; 
  fdi.T_FCV1=0.0; 
  fdi.T_FCV2=0.0; 
} 
extern "C" 
 void simulationData() 
{ 
 174
  simulation.power=DDD.DDDQthnew; //reactor power 
  simulation.T_hl=DDD.DDDTold5; // hot leg temperature 
  simulation.T_cl=DDD.DDDTold14;// cold leg temperature 
  simulation.P_PRZ=PPP.PPPPprz;//  pressure in the pressurizer 
  simulation.L_PRZ=PPP.PPPPrzLvlP; //level in the pressurizer 
  simulation.L_SG=SSS.SSSSGLvl1NR; //steam generator water level 
  simulation.flow_FCV=SSS.SSSFlowfd1; //feed water flow rate to SG1 
  simulation.T_FCV=TREND.FeedTemp; //main feed water temperature 
  simulation.flow_TCV=SSS.SSSFlowSG1;//steam flow rate from SG1 
  simulation.speed_Turbine=0.0; 
//  simulation.load=BOPINIT.Wturb;// turbine output 
} 
extern "C" 
   void FCVData() 
{ 
 BOPINIT.FCV1=FCV1.stuck;  //valves stuck position 
 VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[0][13]=FCV1.offset;   
 VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[0][13]=FCV1.timeconst; //time constant 
 BOPINIT.FCV2=FCV2.stuck;  //valves stuck position 
 VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[1][13]=FCV2.offset;  // offset fault  
 VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[1][13]=FCV2.timeconst; //time constant 
} 
 
   void initialFCVData() 
{ 
 FCV1.stuck=BOPINIT.FCV1;  //valves stuck position 
 FCV1.offset=VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[0][13];   
 FCV1.timeconst=VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[0][13]; //time constant 
 FCV2.stuck=BOPINIT.FCV2;  //valves stuck position 
 FCV2.offset=VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[1][13];  // offset fault  
 FCV2.timeconst=VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[1][13]; //time constant 
} 



















    void TCVData() 
{ 
VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[0][2]=TCV1.offset;  // offset fault  
 VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[0][2]=TCV1.timeconst; //time constant 
VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[1][2]=TCV2.offset;  // offset fault  
 VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[1][2]=TCV2.timeconst; //time constant 
VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[2][2]=TCV3.offset;  // offset fault  
 VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[2][2]=TCV3.timeconst; //time constant 
VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[3][2]=TCV4.offset;  // offset fault  
 VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[3][2]=TCV4.timeconst; //time constant 
} 
extern "C" 
    void initialTCVData() 
{ 
TCV1.offset=VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[0][2];  // offset fault  
 TCV1.timeconst=VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[0][2]; //time constant 
TCV2.offset=VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[1][2];  // offset fault  
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 TCV2.timeconst=VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[1][2]; //time constant 
TCV3.offset=VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[2][2];  // offset fault  
 TCV3.timeconst=VALVEPROPERTIES.Tau[2][2]; //time constant 
TCV4.offset=VALVEPROPERTIES.DeadBand[3][2];  // offset fault  




 void ControllerData() 
{ 
FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[0][0]=controller1.offset;       // main feed water control valve 1 controller offset fault 
 FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[1][0]=controller1.Kp;  //main feed water control valve 1   controller proportional gain 
 FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[2][0]=controller1.Ki;       //main feed water control valve 1  controller integral gain fault 
 FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[0][1]=controller2.offset;       // main feed water control valve 1 controller offset fault 
 FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[1][1]=controller2.Kp;  //main feed water control valve 1   controller proportional gain 




 void initialControllerData() 
{ 
 fdi.set_power=BOPLOAD.aload; 
 controller1.offset=FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[0][0];       // main feed water control valve 1 controller offset fault 
 controller1.Kp=FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[1][0];  //main feed water control valve 1   controller proportional gain 
 controller1.Ki=FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[2][0];       //main feed water control valve 1  controller integral gain fault 
 controller2.offset=FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[0][1];       // main feed water control valve 1 controller offset fault 
 controller2.Kp=FEEDCONTROL.FeedGain[1][1];  //main feed water control valve 1   controller proportional gain 




 void initPower() 
{ 
G_aload=BOPLOAD.aload;  
 G_bload=BOPLOAD.bload;   




 void PowerChange() 
{ 
BOPLOAD.aload=G_aload;   




















}      
/*Function to be called from an RTM*/ 
extern "C" 
   int32 stopApplication(int32 numArgs,void* args) 
 { 
   quit(); 
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   return OK; 
} 
 
/*Function to be called from an RTM*/ 
extern "C" 
   int32 datMount(int32 numArgs, void* args) 
{ 
  
   void* data; 
   int32 type, size; 
   if (numArgs !=2) 
   return !OK; 
   data=PfGetFuncArg(&args,&type,&size); 
   if (type!=PfCInt||size!=1) 
   return !OK; 
   datPoint=*(int32*)data; 
   data=PfGetFuncArg(&args,&type,&size); 
   if (type!=PfCFloat||size!=1) 
   return !OK; 
   timeInterval=*(float*)data; 
   printf("data Points =%d,timeInterval=%5.2f\n",datPoint,timeInterval); 




    void PushData(int rows,int cols,double pr_data[]) 
// This is a small program to push data into mxArray Data Structure; 
{ 
      double  *start_of_pr; 
//      mxArray *array_ptr; 
 
     /* Create a 2-by-4 real double matrix named "B". */  
     XX = mxCreateDoubleMatrix(rows, cols, mxREAL); 
     mxSetName(XX, "B"); 
 
     /* Populate the real part of the created array. */  
     start_of_pr = (double *)mxGetPr(XX); 
     memcpy(start_of_pr, pr_data, rows * cols * sizeof(double) ); 
} 
 
//   void mexFunction(int nlhs,mxArray *plhs[],int nrhs,const mxArray *prhs[]) 
   extern "C" 
   void ExtractData(const mxArray * XY) 
// This is a small program to push data into mxArray Data Structure);  
   { 
      int c, total_num_of_elements;  
      double *real_data_ptr; 
        
        if (mxIsDouble(XY))  {  
          /* Get starting address of real data in input array. */ 
            real_data_ptr = (double *)mxGetPr(XY); 
 
          /* Using pointer auto-increment, display every element in  
             the array. */ 
            total_num_of_elements = mxGetM(XY) * mxGetN(XY); 
           
          /* Display the contents of every real value. */ 
            for (c = 0; c < total_num_of_elements; c++) 
   {  
       diags[c]=*real_data_ptr;  
    printf("%g\n", *real_data_ptr++); 
 
   } 
        }  
        else 






double * getData() 
{ 






















































FaultTable[6]="Bypass valve error"; 
FaultTable[7]="TCV degradation"; 
FaultTable[8]="Unknown Fault"; 
if (diags[0]==0.0) faultDDD=FaultTable[0]; 
if (diags[0]==1.0) faultDDD=FaultTable[1];   
if (diags[0]==2.0) faultDDD=FaultTable[2]; 
if (diags[0]==3.0) faultDDD=FaultTable[3];   
if (diags[0]==4.0) faultDDD=FaultTable[4]; 
if (diags[0]==5.0) faultDDD=FaultTable[5];   
if (diags[0]==6.0) faultDDD=FaultTable[6]; 
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if (diags[0]==7.0) faultDDD=FaultTable[7];   
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